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This thesis looks at legal mechanisms allowing the non-collection of tax debts in 
the tax systems of Canada and the United States. The goal is to shed light on the choices 
made in Canada’s tax collection system by juxtaposing it with the American system. The 
comparison reveals differences in the ways in which the two jurisdictions allow taxpayers 
to participate in the tax system and differences in how the two jurisdictions choose to 
make decisions about the forgiveness of tax debts. Although Canada has generally 
rejected the idea of compromise within the tax system, there is a tax policy case to be 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
Then tax collectors also came to be baptized, and said to 
him, “Teacher, what shall we do?” And he said to them, 
“Collect no more than what is appointed for you.”
1
 
I shall risk this proposition: each time forgiveness is at the 
service of a finality, be it noble and spiritual (atonement or 
redemption, reconciliation, salvation), each time that it 
aims to re-establish a normality (social, national, political, 
psychological) by a work of mourning, by some therapy or 
ecology of memory, then the ‘forgiveness’ is not pure – nor 
is its concept. Forgiveness is not, it should not be, normal, 
normative, normalising. It should remain exceptional and 
extraordinary, in the face of the impossible: as if it 
interrupted the ordinary course of historical temporality.
2
 
The aims of this thesis are to look at situations in which the tax authorities in 
Canada are willing to accept less than the full amount assessed under the Income Tax Act, 
those in which they are forbidden from doing so, and those in which accepting less than 
the full amount might further the goals of the income tax system.
3
 To illuminate the 
Canadian approach on these issues, I compare it with that of the United States. In this 
introductory chapter, I explain my approach to analysis, expand upon the goals of the 
project, and provide a brief overview of each of the four substantive chapters of the 
thesis. 
 I use several terms interchangeably throughout this thesis. In discussing the 
settlement, compromise, and forgiveness of tax debts, I am, in each case, referring to 
some situation in which the tax authority accepts less that it believes the government is 
owed. A tax debt is forgiven; a tax dispute is settled; a tax assessment is compromised. I 
                                                 
1
 Luke 3:12-13 (New King James Version). I am not aware of John the Baptist providing any direction 
about accepting less than “what is appointed”. 
2
 Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, translated by Mark Dooley & Michael Hughes 
(New York: Routledge, 2001) at 31–32 [emphasis in original]. 
3
 Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) [ITA]. 
2 
choose these three terms, each with a slightly different connotation, to describe the same 
action to highlight the idea that we might see the action in different ways. Forgiveness 
has overtones of the Abrahamic faiths, but is also thought of as a secular virtue.
4
 
Compromise can have both positive and negative connotations – compromise to resolve a 
dispute verses a compromise of one’s principles.
5
 Settlement is similar to compromise, 
but with perhaps fewer negative connotations, and an increased sense of finality.
6
 While I 
do not undertake any deeper analysis of the linguistics of the question, my intention is to 
highlight the fact that there are several ways that we might think about the non-collection 
of a tax liability. 
In addition to exploring different approaches to the question, which I explain 
further below, my goal is, in part, to make an attempt to contribute to the relatively thin 
academic literature on tax administration in Canada. To date, both tax law scholars and 
administrative law scholars have left Canada’s tax administration largely overlooked.
7
 
Others have looked at cultures of tax collection in other jurisdictions, administrative 
issues in tax generally, and even questions around the justifications for compromise in the 
American context.
8
 In Canada, however, there is still work to be done in developing the 
discussion of tax administration.
9
 
                                                 
4
 Charles L Griswold, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007) at xv. 
5
 Merriam-Webster provides two alternative definitions for “compromise”, as follows: “settlement of 
differences by arbitration or by consent reached by mutual concessions”, and, “a concession to something 
derogatory or prejudicial <a compromise of principles>” (Merriam-Webster, online: <http://www.merriam-
webster.com>. 
6
 Among the definitions of “settle”, are the following: “to fix or resolve conclusively”; “to conclude (a 
lawsuit) by agreement between parties usually out of court”; and “to close (as an account) by payment often 
of less than is due” (Merriam-Webster, ibid.) 
7
 See similar comments in Lorne Mitchell Sossin, Revenue, Ideology, and Legitimacy: The Politics of Tax 
Administration in Canada (PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 1992) [unpublished] at 9. I suggest that the 
situation is largely the same today. 
8
 Ann Mumford, Taxing Culture: Towards a Theory of Tax Collection Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002); 
Bryan T Camp, “Theory and Practice of Tax Administration” (2009) 29 Va Tax Rev 227; Bryan T Camp, 
3 
Part of the reason for taking a comparative approach to the question was to allow 
me to tap into the broader and deeper bodies of scholarship that are found in other 
jurisdictions. The comparative approach I employ might be considered a functionalist 
one, in that I look at the approaches of two jurisdictions to a question that, arguably, all 
tax systems will be forced to answer: when, if ever, should the tax authority accept less 
than the amount of the liability calculated in the normal course of the operation of the tax 
system?
10
 However, the functionalist approach is open to a number of criticisms. The 
functionalist relies on the questionable assumption that the law is called upon to resolve 
the same social issues in different legal systems.
11
 Moreover, functionalism generally 
focuses only on law’s practical consequences as comparable results, largely ignoring 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and 
Reform Act of 1998” (2004) 56 Fla L Rev 1; Bryan T Camp, “The Failure of Adversarial Process in the 
Administrative State” (2009) 84 Ind L J 57; Shu-Yi Oei, “Getting More by Asking Less: Justifying and 
Reforming Tax Law’s Offer-in-Compromise Procedure” (2012) 160:4 U Pa L Rev 1071 [Oei, “Getting 
More”]; Shu-Yi Oei, “Who Wins When Uncle Same Loses? Social Insurance and the Forgiveness of Tax 
Debts” (2012) 46:2 UC Davis L Rev 421 [Oei, “Social Insurance”]. 
9
 While highlighting some gaps in the academic literature around tax administration in Canada, I would not 
want to be understood to be disparaging the valuable work that has been done directed at academics and 
practitioners, many of which I draw on in this thesis. See, for example: Canada, Report of the Royal 
Commission on Taxation (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966) [Carter Report], vol 5, part B. Colin Campbell, 
Administration of Income Tax 2012 (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) [Campbell, Administration 2012]; David 
Robertson et al, Couzin Taylor’s Guide to Canadian Income Tax Administration (Toronto: Ernst &Young, 
Canadian Institute of Charter Accountants, 2011); Daniel Sandler & Colin Campbell, “Catch-22: A 
Principled Basis for the Settlement of Tax Appeals” (2009) 57:4 Can Tax J 25; 2012 Tax Dispute 
Resolution, Compliance, and Administration Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 
2013) [2012 Tax Dispute Resolution, Compliance, and Administration Report] ; Colin Campbell & 
Maureen Berry, “Back to the Future: Is It Time To Put Revenue Canada into Commission?” (1995) 43:6 
Can Tax J 1901; Colin Campbell, “Access to Justice in Income Tax Appeals” (2012) 63 UNBLJ 445; as 
well as several essays in Kim Brooks, ed, The Quest for Tax Reform Continues: The Royal Commission on 
Taxation Fifty Years Later (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) [Brooks, Fifty Years Later] [forthcoming]. 
10
 The leading account of functionalism is often taken to be the introductory chapter of  onrad  weigert & 
 ein   t , Introduction to Comparative Law, 3d ed, translated by Tony Weir (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998) at 32–47, which first appeared in 1977 in the first edition of that book. See also: Ralf Michaels, “The 
Functional Method of Comparative Law” in Reinhard  immermann & Mathias Reimann, eds, The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 339; Richard Hyland, 
“Comparative Law” in Dennis Patterson, ed, A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996) 184 at 187–90. 
11
 Hyland, supra note 10 at 189. 
4 
context for the sake of focusing on function.
12
 It also assumes that different legal systems 




However, my goals for the comparative analysis in this thesis are modest. The 
hope is not to unearth a common or best solution – to search for a universal or general 
law as comparativists are sometimes accused of doing.
14
 I aim to shed some light on the 
approaches to the settlement, compromise, or forgiveness of tax debts chosen by the 
designers of the Canadian tax system. In pursuing this goal, two difficulties arise that can 
be mitigated by the use of a comparative approach. First, there may be a tendency to 
think of our chosen approach as “universal or ‘inevitable’ in nature”.
15
 Our tax system is 
complex, and, as a result, those who study it spend a fair amount of time and energy 
understanding and rationalizing it.
16
 The result, in some cases, is a constrained ability to 
imagine how things could be different. Second, Canada’s approach to compromise in the 
tax system is restrictive. Where the rule is fairly stark and simple – “no compromise” – 
one way to illuminate both the norms underlying such a rule and its consequences is to 
imagine an alternative. However, the complexity and scale of the tax system in Canada 
mean that a myriad of potential sites for forgiveness of taxpayers might be imagined, and 
a wide variety of schemes might be designed to allow for forgiveness.  
Fortunately, there is no need to invent an alternative out of whole cloth. The 
United States takes a markedly different approach to these issues, and a juxtaposition of 
                                                 
12
 Ibid at 188. 
13
 Ibid at 190. 
14
 Gunter Frankenberg, “Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law” (1985) 26  arv Int’l L J 
411 [Frankenberg, “Critical Comparisons”] at 440;  yland, supra note 10 at 186–87. 
15
 Michael A Livingston, “Law, Culture, and Anthropology: On the  opes and Limits of Comparative Tax” 
(2005) 18 Can JL & Jur 119 at 123. 
16
 Charlotte Crane, “The Income Tax and the Burden of Perfection” (2006) 100 Nw U L Rev 171. 
5 
the two systems will be revealing. Moreover, the comparison need not be overly 
reductive. I do pay some attention to context, though it would be impossible to fully 
explore the legal and cultural contexts in which the two tax systems operate. While 
cultural differences between Canada and the United States may explain the differences in 
approach to this issue, there is a sense in which the two countries share a similar 
conversation as it relates to tax. 
Where the goal is, as Michael Livingston has suggested, appreciating one’s own 
culture by being exposed to another, much of the criticism of comparative functionalism 
loses its sting (or, perhaps, the project ceases to be functionalism in its pure form).
17
 
Difference need not be assumed away and context need not be ignored. Moreover, many 
of the assumptions of functionalism appear to be true in this case: modern, industrialized 
countries with developed income tax systems will choose to incorporate outlets for 
compromise and forgiveness into their tax systems or will decide against doing so. The 
consequences of this choice, at least in the Canadian context, are worth exploring. 
 Demonstrating that question is worth exploring is the focus of the second chapter 
of this thesis. There I lay out some of the historical evolution of the rules that forbid 
compromise in the Canadian tax system. I also briefly explain the American approach 
that I will use throughout the thesis to provide juxtaposition for the Canadian rules. I 
suggest that the academic literature has given relatively little consideration to these 
issues, and note that the influential Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation 
suggested a different course for the Canadian tax system.
18
 I argue that, while the 
Canadian approach appears on the surface to be in line with our tax policy goals, there 
                                                 
17
 Livingston, supra note 15 at 123. 
18
 Carter Report, supra note 9. 
6 
are reasons to look more closely at how the rules operate and to consider alternative 
approaches. 
 The Canadian approach is one that generally refuses to compromise, either to 
settle a tax dispute or for the purposes of collecting part of a debt. The Income Tax Act 
gives the Minister of National Revenue the power to forgive interest and penalties, but 
this power does not extend to the core of the tax liability assessed. On the surface, this 
seems to reflect a concern for equity between taxpayers. On this view, equity requires 
that each taxpayer is assessed according to the established rules, and that each taxpayer 
be required to pay the tax assessed in full. However, I suggest that there are reasons to 
believe that strict enforcement of these rules may, at times, create inequity, and that 
compromise is worth exploring as a way to mitigate inequity that exists in the tax system. 
 In chapter 3, I look closely at the administrative processes that Canada and the 
United States use to compromise tax liability.
19
 These include statutory provisions, 
administrative guidelines, and principles applied on judicial review of administrative 
action in the two countries. In particular, I examine the following: the American offer-in-
compromise program which allows the partial forgiveness of tax debts; the Canadian 
taxpayer relief provisions, which allow the forgiveness of interest and penalties but not 
taxes; and the Canadian “principled basis” doctrine, which forbids the tax authorities 
from compromising for the purpose of settling a tax dispute. 
After examining the details of these mechanisms, I draw on the taxonomy of legal 
processes developed in the work of Lon Fuller and I argue that Canada’s tax system uses 
adjudicative processes and eschews contractual bargaining processes. This observation 
                                                 
19
 Throughout the thesis I use “tax liability” and “tax debt” meaning all liability imposed under the taxing 
statute, including interest and penalties. 
7 
holds true even in contexts where contractual bargaining processes might have been 
expected, and where the process looks superficially like a contractual bargaining process. 
The result is that American taxpayers have access to mode of participation in the tax 
system that is not available to Canadian taxpayers. 
 In the fourth chapter I add some context to the discussion of the collection and 
compromise of tax debts. I examine the various collection powers that are available to the 
Internal Revenue Service and the Canada Revenue Agency, and the positions of the tax 
authorities in bankruptcy proceedings. Two related conclusions come out of this 
exploration. The first is that the choice against building a compromise mechanism into 
the Canadian tax system can not be convincingly explained by its strong position as a 
creditor. While the CRA does have strong powers to allow it to collect its debts prior to 
the debtor’s insolvency, the IRS has comparable powers, and so the difference between 
the two regimes can not be explained so easily. Moreover, the CRA is not given a 
privileged position in bankruptcy proceedings, and, is arguably in a worse position than 
its American counterpart.  
Having rejected one potential description of the difference between the two 
systems, I argue that the data suggest another description. In Canada, tax debts are 
forgiven, but the decision making processes for that forgiveness are located outside of the 
tax system. In the United States, the decision making about forgiveness of tax debts is 
reserved for the tax system. Each of these broad statements, while requiring some added 
nuance, is informative. 
 In chapter 5, I argue that a case can be made on tax policy grounds for 
compromise in certain situations in the Canadian income tax system. I suggest that a 
8 
compromise mechanism could be designed guided by the traditional tax policy 
considerations: administrative practicality, equity, and neutrality. I make the argument 
drawing on that framework, and briefly sketch out the parameters that a compromise 
procedure might fall within in order to further our tax policy goals. 
 I suggest that it is relatively clear that giving the tax authority the power to 
compromise can improve the administrative practicality of the system. More 
controversially, I argue that there are several ways in which we might expect a 
compromise program to improve the equity of the tax system. I acknowledge that there 
may be concerns about the incentives that a compromise program would create, but 
suggest that such a program could be designed to mitigate these. I also briefly explore the 
possibility that we might think of a compromise program as a tax expenditure rather than 
as a part of the technical tax system. 
 To conclude, I acknowledge the perils of suggesting that a foreign legal 
mechanism like the American offer-in-compromise program could be easily transplanted 
into Canadian law. Indeed, one way to view the differences explored in this thesis is as a 
manifestation of different legal cultures around tax collection: the American culture of 
“rough justice” and the Canadian culture that expects more precision and rigour in the 
calculation of tax liability and in tax collection. However, both the American experience 
and the tax policy case I present here recommend that some compromise mechanism be 
implemented in the Canadian income tax system. 
 
9 
CHAPTER 2:  SETTLEMENT AND COMPROMISE IN CANADIAN 
INCOME TAX LAW SINCE CARTER20 
“[W]e have regarded these [administrative] matters as of 
major concern if only because shortcomings in the tax 
organization can frustrate the best tax policy. In a sense tax 




2.1 IMPORTANT, BUT OVERLOOKED 
It is perhaps unsurprising that in the melee immediately following the release of 
the Carter Report, relatively little attention was paid to the Commission’s 
recommendations for the administration of the income tax system.
22
 After all, the 
Commission gave the tax administration a “fairly clean bill of health”, and there were 
larger battles to be waged over the idea of a comprehensive tax base and the role of 
equity in a tax system.
23
 In the decades since the Commission reported, some of the 
larger recommendations for administration have been implemented – the Tax Court of 
Canada has replaced the Tax Appeal Board, for example – and the debates over some of 
the Commission’s more contentions proposals have continued.
24
 
                                                 
20
 A modified version of this chapter appears in the forthcoming: Brooks, Fifty Years Later, supra note 9. 
Reproduced by permission of Carswell, a division of Thomson Reuters Canada Limited. 
21
 Carter Report, supra note 9, vol 5 at 95. 
22
 However, see: Harold Buchwald, Administration and the Carter Report (Don Mills, Ont: CCH Canadian, 
1967); John G McDonald, Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation: Tax Administration (Toronto: 
Butterworths, 1968). 
23
 Carter Report, supra note 9, vol 5 at 95. Even when writing a largely positive review of the 
Commission’s administrative recommendations, Harold Buchwald felt the need to voice his agreement with 
“those who have challenged the Commission’s underlying thesis of an ‘equitable’ tax system” (Buchwald, 
supra note 22 at 7). 
24
 The Commissioners recommended the establishment of the Tax Court of Canada: Carter Report, supra 
note 9, vol 5 at 166-67. Although the precise structure of the court recommended by the Royal Commission 
was not adopted, the Tax Court of Canada was created in 1983 by the Tax Court of Canada Act, RSC 1985, 
c T-2 [TCC Act]. For examples of ways in which the Royal Commission’s work still influences debates 
around taxation in Canada, see: W Neil Brooks, ed, The Quest for Tax Reform: The Royal Commission on 
Taxation Twenty Years Later (Toronto: Carswell, 1988); Brooks, Fifty Years Later, supra note 9. 
10 
Meanwhile, proposals that the Commission made around the settlement and 
compromise of debts arising under the Income Tax Act have gone relatively unnoticed 
and have been rarely discussed in the scholarly literature.
25
 Further, the development of 
Canadian tax law and practice in this area has, in some ways, moved in the opposite 
direction from that recommended by the Carter Report.  
In this chapter, I present the Royal Commission’s recommendations dealing with 
the settlement and compromise of tax debts. I also discuss how the law in this area has 
evolved in Canada since the Carter Report. In particular, my focus is on the discretionary 
power of the Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”) to cancel or waive interest 
and penalties assessed under the Income Tax Act and the requirement that tax disputes be 
settled only on a principled legal basis.
26
 However, it is important to realize that the 
Minister’s limited powers to settle and compromise tax debts exist in a context that 
allows other possible avenues for taxpayers to be relieved of tax debts, such as the 
bankruptcy system and remission orders under the Financial Administration Act.
27
 
I argue that, at first blush, Canadian law in this area might be seen as honouring 
the Commission’s commitment to equity in tax law. After all, refusing to compromise a 
tax assessment reinforces the idea that all taxpayers are being treated according to the 
rules.  However, the fact that the Carter Report recommended broader powers for the 
Minister to compromise and settle should lead us to investigate further. In that sense, one 
of the main goals of this chapter is to justify the deeper exploration of compromise and 
forgiveness mechanisms in chapters 3, 4, and 5. 
                                                 
25




 Financial Administration Act, RSC 1985, c F-11 [FAA] s 23(2). 
11 
2.2 THE CARTER COMMISSION ON SETTLEMENT AND COMPROMISE 
 Although the Commission found the administration of Canada’s tax system to be 
in relatively good shape, the Carter Report does identify several areas for improvement. 
In this section, I look at some aspects of the Commission’s proposals for the settlement of 
tax disputes without litigation and their recommended importation of an “offer of 
compromise” procedure.
28
 To some degree, these proposals were intended to respond to 
specific issues identified in the Commission’s research, and so I discuss that context as 
well. 
 The Commission’s proposals regarding the settlement of tax disputes responded 
to two related problems. On the one hand, the Commission felt that too many tax disputes 
were proceeding through the administrative appeal process and to litigation, and it sought 
to facilitate the settlement of these disputes at as early a stage as possible.
29
 On the other 
hand, the Commission believed that public confidence in the tax system required “an 
open-handed and above-board dispensation of justice”, and expressed their concern that 
the public’s faith was being undermined by private and confidential settlements.
30
 
 To facilitate settlement of tax disputes, the Commission recommended a number 
of structural changes to the taxation division of the Department of National Revenue, 
including that it be replaced by a more independent Board of Revenue Commissioners. 
Most significantly for the discussion of settlement and compromise, the Carter Report 
suggests that the officers dealing with administrative appeals “should be given wide 
                                                 
28
 The Carter Report uses the terminology “offer of compromise” while the American procedure is 
currently called “offer in compromise” (26 USC § 7122(c)). In this chapter, I use the two interchangeably 
to denote some administrative procedure by which Canada’s tax collectors might be permitted to collect 
less than the amount assessed. 
29
 Carter Report, supra note 9, vol 5 at 161-62. 
30
 Ibid, vol 5 at 96. 
12 
powers of compromise and settlement similar to those given technical advisers in the 
Appellate Division in the United States.”
31
 In part, the Commission’s intent was to reduce 
the bureaucratic obstacles to settlement by taking the head office out of the equation and 
empowering officers at the district level, subject to the approval of a regional 
supervisor.
32
  owever, it seems clear that the use of the word “compromise” was 
intentional, as one commentator noted at the time: 
This should go a long way towards effecting settlements 
where each party – both taxpayer and administration – 
believes himself correct and each has to get some 
concession from the other. Additionally, it will permit 
settlements in equitable areas where the transaction is 
probably within the confines of a legislative provision, 
which, no matter how willing the administration might be 
to waive, it legally can not, and, most important, it will 
legalize many settlements that have in fact been worked out 
in the guise of so-called “adjustments”.
33
 
In this chapter, I use the word “compromise” in this sense as well: to indicate a reduction 
in tax liability without a proper basis to change the underlying assessment of tax. The 
Carter Report recommended that the tax authorities be allowed to enter into compromise 
settlements with taxpayers; however, as I discuss below, they remain forbidden from 
doing so. 
 Another recommendation that the Royal Commission made about the partial 
forgiveness of tax debts deserves more attention than it has received. In a discussion of 
tax collection, the Commission recommended that Canada implement an “offer of 
compromise” procedure similar to that available to taxpayers in the United States.
34
 
Broadly speaking, the procedure would allow taxpayers to offer to settle their debts for 
                                                 
31




 Buchwald, supra note 22 at 28. 
34
 Carter Report, supra note 9, vol 5 at 149. 
13 
less than the full amount owing without any challenge to the correctness of the 
assessment.
35
 Under the system as it currently stands in the United States, tax liability 
may be compromised for any of three reasons: doubt as to the liability; doubt as to 
collectability; or to promote effective tax administration.
36
 Under the terms of the 
compromise, the taxpayer waives his or her right to contest the amount of the tax debt 
and agrees to file tax returns and pay the required taxes for the next five years.
37
 
The Royal Commission suggested that the revenue authorities should accept 
compromise offers from taxpayers who owe more than their net worth, but that the 
procedure should be unavailable to those who had knowingly understated their income.
38
 
The Commissioners also recommended that all compromises be made public to guard 
against abuse of the system.
39
 
Given the Commission’s overriding concern for equity in the tax system, it is 
striking that the Carter Report contains no consideration of the objections to compromise 
that might be raised on equitable grounds. After all, it would seem that the goals of 
assessing tax equitably on the comprehensive tax base would be frustrated if some 
taxpayers are not required to pay the tax assessed. By allowing the Minister to settle tax 
disputes on a compromise basis rather than defending the correctness of the assessment, 
we would risk privileging those taxpayers who fight with the revenue authority. 
Similarly, if we compromise to alleviate the hardships of taxpayers who owe more than 
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they can pay, we would risk subsidizing the overconsumption or risky behaviour of those 
taxpayers. 
 The Commission’s recommendations for compromise might simply be considered 
pragmatic suggestions to aid the efficient collection of tax. Accepting a compromise 
settlement, rather than litigating on principle, will be a money saving option in cases 
where the amount of tax at issue is less than the considerable cost of going to court. 
Compromising in the collections context would allow the tax authorities to weigh the 
costs of applying the Minister’s full panoply of collection procedures against the benefits 
of collecting part of the debt with less effort.
40
 
 However, to explain the Commission’s proposals simply as trading administrative 
practicality for equity would be treating the subject too lightly. Given the degree to which 
concerns for equity and fairness permeate the Carter Report, it is worth considering 
whether a case for compromise can be made on those grounds. To begin, I examine the 
Canadian law in this area as it has developed since the release of the Carter Report, and 
argue that, while it appears at first blush to have been designed with fairness and equity 
in mind, there are significant practical difficulties that should lead us to reconsider the 
desirability of compromise. 
2.3 A “PRINCIPLED BASIS” FOR SETTLING DISPUTES 
While the recommendations of the Carter Report on compromise and forgiveness 
of tax liability have gone largely unconsidered in the academic literature, Canadian law 
and practice have taken steps in the other direction. At least since the 1970s, Canadian 
courts have been clear in sending the message that the Minister of National Revenue’s 
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power to administer the Income Tax Act includes very limited discretion to settle, 
compromise, or forgive tax debts. The Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Galway is 
usually understood as the best authority for the restrictions on the Minister’s ability to 
settle disputes; however, as mentioned above, the understanding of the Minister’s powers 
that crystallized in Galway goes back at least to the days of the Royal Commission.
41
 
 Frank Galway had been associated with a real estate brokerage, but described 
himself as a “business broker”. That is, he acted for either the purchaser or the vendor in 
the purchase and sale of businesses as going concerns. In addition to being a broker, Mr. 
Galway operated businesses that he acquired in Canada and in the U.K.
42
 Though a series 
of transactions in 1960 and 1961, he found himself richer by $200,500 worth of shares. 
The Minister characterized this receipt as remuneration for services rendered, arguing 
that Mr. Galway had acted as a broker in this series of transactions and been paid in 
shares for his work. In appealing his assessment, Mr. Galway described himself as an 
investor in the enterprise, rather than a broker, making his efforts in the enterprise 
equivalent to capital expenditures. He argued that the shares should be characterized as 




 Mr. Galway lost his appeals at the Tax Appeal Board and at the Federal Court, 
Trial Division.
44
 He filed a further appeal before the parties agreed to a settlement of the 
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dispute. On the $200,500 of taxable income, Mr. Galway had been assessed $133,381.58 
in tax and another $32,344.89 in interest. To settle the appeal, the Minister agreed to 
accept $100,000. 
 Faced with an application for a consent judgment on those terms, the Federal 
Court of Appeal balked. A panel consisting of Chief Justice Jackett and Justices Thurlow 
and Pratte expressed doubts about their authority to set aside the Trial Division’s 
judgment and order a lump sum reassessment of $100,000 for taxes and interest, and 
asked the parties to make further submissions on the subject.
45
 
Given this opportunity, the parties essentially agreed that the consent judgment 
could not be given on the terms proposed, and attempted to find another way to 
accomplish the same end.
46
 The judges explained that the Minister is not empowered to 
implement a compromise, and the Court can not authorize it: 
The Minister has a statutory duty to assess the amount of 
tax payable on the facts as he finds them in accordance 
with the law as he understands it. It follows that he cannot 
assess for some amount designed to implement a 
compromise settlement and that, when the Trial Division, 
or this Court on appeal, refers an assessment back to the 
Minister for re-assessment, it must be for re-assessment on 




The parties were then invited to submit a revised application for consent judgment that 
reflected the proper application of the law to the facts.
48
 
 A similar case that was decided after Galway, but which relates to events that 
occurred before the decision in Galway was released, reinforced the principled basis 
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doctrine. In Cohen, the Federal Court of Appeal dealt with a taxpayer who claimed that 
he had agreed not to appeal his assessments for 1961-64 in exchange for the Minister’s 
agreement to treat proceeds from the sale of certain pieces of land in 1965 and 1966 as 
capital gains. Writing for a unanimous panel of the court, Justice Pratte held that, if such 
an agreement had been made, it would be illegal and would not bind the Minister.
49
 
While in Galway the compromise was obvious – there was no basis under the Income Tax 
Act to accept $100,000 in place of the assessed amount – Cohen confirms that it is not 
only obvious compromises that are forbidden. The Minister is also prevented from taking 
an assessing position that does not reflect her true understanding of the facts to 
implement a compromise. 
Some, including Chief Justice Bowman and Professors Hogg, Magee, and Li, 
have found the Federal Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Galway and Cohen difficult, if not 
impossible, to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s decision in Smerchanski.
50
 The tax 
authorities had agreed not to prosecute Mr. Smerchanski for tax evasion in exchange for a 
waiver of the his right to appeal. Chief Justice Laskin, writing for the majority, concluded 
that the waiver was enforceable and Mr. Smerchanski was barred from appealing.
51
 
Professors Hogg, Magee, and Li argue that the effect of Smerchanski and Cohen 
together is that “the taxpayer is bound by a settlement agreement, but the Minister is 
not.”
52
 That is, the Minister and her delegates are constrained by their statutory powers 
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and duties, while taxpayers are free to bind themselves in settlement agreements. They 
critici e the Federal Court of Appeal’s position on practical and pragmatic grounds: 
The attitude of the Federal Court of Appeal in Cohen and 
Galway is far too rigid and doctrinaire. If the Minister were 
really unable to make compromise settlements, he or she 
would be denied an essential tool of enforcement. The 
Minister must husband the CRA's limited resources, and it 
is not realistic to require the Minister to insist on every last 
legal point, and to litigate every dispute to the bitter end. 
Most disputes about tax are simply disputes about money 
which are inherently capable of resolution by compromise. 
Presumably, the Minister would agree to a compromise 
settlement only on the basis that it offered a better net 
recovery than would probably be achieved by continuance 
of the litigation. It seems foolish to require the Minister to 
incur the unnecessary costs of avoidable litigation in the 
name of an abstract statutory duty to apply the law. It 
seems obvious that the Act should be amended to give the 
Minister express authority to settle cases.
53
 
Later court decisions have held that the Minister may be bound by settlement 
agreements, where those agreements can be said to constitute an application of the law to 
the facts. While a compromise settlement without a basis in law would be ultra vires, the 
Minister might be convinced in settlement discussions that her initial view of the facts or 
the law was incorrect. Settlement is possible where a basis in the law – often referred to 
as a “principled basis” – exists to support it.
54
 Judges of the Tax Court have taken the 
view that settlement agreements can be enforced against the Crown under these 
conditions, and, further, have suggested that it might not be their role to look closely at 
the propriety of these agreements.
55
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19 
 To see the practical effect of the principled basis doctrine, we can consider the 
case of CIBC World Markets, which involved a dispute over the amount of input tax 
credits the appellant company could claim under Canada’s Excise Tax Act.
56
 Prior to 
litigation in the Tax Court, CIBC World Markets offered, in writing, to accept a 
reassessment allowing 90% of the input tax credits that it had originally claimed.
57
 The 
offer apparently had no expiry date, and was on the table throughout the litigation.
58
 The 
appellant lost at the Tax Court, but won on appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, and, as 
a result, was allowed all of the input tax credits it had originally claimed.
59
 
 Under both the Tax Court Rules and the Federal Court Rules, an offer to settle can 
be considered in making a cost award.
60
 Accordingly, CIBC World Markets argued that it 
had offered to settle on more favourable terms than the Crown eventually received from 
the Court, and so a higher than normal cost award was appropriate. The Federal Court of 
Appeal, however, accepted the Crown’s argument that the Minister was not at liberty to 
accept the offer because the issue in the case was a binary, all-or-nothing, question of 
statutory interpretation. The Minister can not settle “solely on the basis of compromise, 
rather than following the facts and the law as the Minister views them or might 
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reasonably defend them”, and so there was no middle ground settlement available to the 
parties, only complete vindication for one or the other.
61
  
It is not entirely clear how often the principled basis doctrine represents an 
insurmountable barrier to settlement rather than an inconvenience in settlement 
negotiations. While Galway and CIBC World Markets are examples of disputes that 
could not be resolved on a principled basis, at least some of the tax bar seems to view the 
principled basis doctrine as a test of inventiveness more than a real bar to settlement. Tax 
lawyers are challenged to present some reasonably defensible version of the facts and law 
that will allow the parties to find a middle ground, and, while there may be significant 
challenges in doing so, some suggest that it is almost always possible.
62
 
Even in considering cases such as Galway and CIBC World Markets, which might 
be viewed as binary, all-or-nothing disputes that are not amenable to settlement on a 
principled basis, we should bear in mind that taxpayers and their representatives have 
some leeway to define the scope of the dispute. The issues on the table are those raised by 
the taxpayer who goes through the administrative appeal process and then drafts the 
Notice of Appeal. In Galway, for example, the evidence was fairly clear in establishing 
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value of the shares that the appellant received.
63
 However, had Mr. Galway been in a 
position to put the value of the shares at issue, or to put some other aspect of his tax 
assessment at issue, he might have had more flexibility in a give-and-take negotiation that 
still needed to respect the requirement for a principled legal basis.
64
 
 Some, including the Federal Court of Appeal in Galway, have suggested that 
although the Minister of National Revenue can not compromise to settle a dispute, the 
Attorney General might be empowered to do so.
65
 This view is based on subsection 5(d) 
of the Department of Justice Act, which gives the Attorney General “regulation and 
conduct of all litigation for or against the Crown or any department”, which might be 
taken to include the power to decide that compromise is appropriate.
66
 
However, the Federal Court of Appeal later backed away from the view that the 
Attorney General might properly agree to a settlement that was not supported by the 
application of the law to the facts, and the more prevalent view is that the Attorney 
General either can not or should not compromise an assessment to settle a tax dispute.
67
 
In practice, it seems that tax litigators from the Department of Justice recognize that 
subsection 5(d) of the Department of Justice Act gives them ultimate control over the 
litigation, but take care to include the position of the Canada Revenue Agency in their 
decision making and will rarely take a course of action that is at odds with the CRA’s 
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 In the normal course of practice, tax litigators at the Department of Justice see 
the CRA as the client from whom they take instructions.
69
 
2.4 FAIRNESS OR RELIEF? 
On December 17, 1991, in the middle of a 200-page bill containing myriad 
amendments to the Income Tax Act and several other acts, the set of provisions that was 
then referred to as the “fairness package” came into force.
70
 The fairness package gave 
the Minister of National Revenue discretion to do the following: reassess in the 
taxpayer’s favour beyond the three-year limitation period; allow elections to be made, 
amended, or revoked beyond the deadline; and, waive or cancel interest and penalties.
71
 
 The first two parts of the fairness package essentially give the Minister discretion 
to grant a reprieve from the inherent harshness of deadlines. Generally speaking, the 
Income Tax Act gives taxpayers three years from the end of the tax year to file an income 
tax return and request a tax refund, and three years from the date of the Minister’s Notice 
of Assessment to ask for an adjustment.
72
 However, subsection 152(4.2) allows 
individuals and testamentary trusts (but not corporations or inter vivos trusts) to request 
that their liability be redetermined within ten years of the end of the tax year, and gives 
the Minister discretion to grant that request; subsection 164(1.5) then allows the Minister 
to issue a tax refund.
73
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 Similarly, subsection 220(3.2) gives the Minister discretion to allow a taxpayer to 
make, revoke, or amend certain elections after the normal deadline to do so, but within 
ten years of the end of the applicable tax year.
74
 In essence, the Minister has the 
discretion to be generous about the timing of taxpayers’ engagement with the system. 
This might include those who were unable to file on time, those who neglected to claim 
some benefit to which they were entitled, and those who wish that they had elected 
different tax treatment. However, these provisions do not allow the Minister to 
compromise or to forgive an amount that is owed. All that she can offer is the tax 
treatment to which the taxpayer would be entitled if not for the deadline. 
 On the other hand, when the Minister waives or cancels penalties or interest, she 
is forgiving an amount that the taxpayer is liable to pay under the Income Tax Act. Again, 
there is a ten year limitation period within which a taxpayer can request that interest or 
penalties be cancelled. While the Income Tax Act provides no direction on how the 
Minister should exercise this discretion, the CRA’s view is that this relief may be 
appropriate for taxpayers who are unable to pay because of financial hardship and for 




 In thinking about relief from interest and penalties, we should consider the nature 
and purpose of interest and penalties. Interest is assessed due to taxpayers’ failure to pay, 
to withhold, or to remit amounts on a timely basis as required by the Income Tax Act.
76
 
Penalties may be assessed due to taxpayers’ failure to file returns as required, failure to 
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make an instalment payment as required, failure to deduct or withhold amounts as 
required, or, failure to remit amounts that were deducted or withheld.
77
 So, the provisions 
in the fairness package centre on forgiving non-compliance or late compliance with the 
Income Tax Act, without compromising the Minister’s assessment. The core of the 
taxpayer’s debt – the tax assessed under the Act – is not compromised or forgiven, except 
to the extent that the cancellation of interest allows inflation to decrease the value of the 
debt over time. 
 The fairness package was originally announced by the Minister of National 
Revenue in May 1991, and was trumpeted as a way to allow the revenue authority (then 
Revenue Canada, Taxation) to administer the tax system more fairly. The increases in the 
Minister’s discretion were painted in a press release as allowing for “common sense” and 
making the tax system “simpler, easier and fairer” for Canadians.
78
 
Politically, the use of the language of “fairness” is consistent with the line of 
attack that the Progressive Conservative party took while in opposition, before winning 
power in 1984. They established a task force that held public consultations on “Revenue 
Canada’s abuse of Canadian taxpayers” and produced a report.
79
 Still, there is something 
striking about the use of the term “fairness” in describing these discretionary provisions. 
It suggests that the discretion is needed to alleviate unfairness that is sometimes caused 
by normal operation of the Income Tax Act. The provisions in the fairness package 
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specifically identify deadlines and penalties (but not the tax assessment itself) as possible 
sources of unfairness. 
 In 2007, the Canada Revenue Agency began phasing out the use of the term 
“fairness” when referring to these provisions.
80
 Since then, CRA has called the former 
fairness package by its new name, “taxpayer relief”. While the Taxpayer Relief 
Procedures Manual, produced for use by CRA officers, still calls the taxpayer relief 
provisions “a good example of the CRA’s commitment to fairness”, the Information 
Circular produced for the public does not use the word “fairness”, except to say that the 
taxpayer relief provisions were formerly known as fairness provisions.
81
 While the 
fairness package indicated a belief that the tax assessed under the Income Tax Act should 
be considered to be fair (and therefore not compromised), the move toward calling these 
discretionary provisions “relief” rather than “fairness” might be thought to signal a 
renewed belief in the fairness of the normal operation of the Income Tax Act, including its 
deadlines, penalties, and interest. 
 Finally, it should be noted that, while the Minister has no power to compromise, 
settle, or forgive an amount of tax assessed, she can recommend that the Governor in 
Council (that is, the Governor General acting on the advice of the federal cabinet) issue a 
remission order pursuant to subsection 23(2) of the Financial Administration Act.
82
 This 
provision allows any tax or penalty, including interest, to be forgiven where “the 
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Governor in Council considers that the collection of the tax or the enforcement of the 
penalty is unreasonable or unjust or that it is otherwise in the public interest to remit the 
tax or penalty.”
83
 These remission orders are required to be made public, and the power is 
used fairly sparingly.
84
 The Public Accounts of Canada 2012 show that 13 remission 
orders were issued in the fiscal year ending on March 31
st
, 2012, forgiving tax, penalties, 
and interest of slightly more than $205,000.
85
 Of those 13, seven involved the remission 
of income tax, and one involved GST.
86
 
2.5 THE NEED TO RECONSIDER COMPROMISE 
 Canada’s treatment of settlement and forgiveness seems designed to reflect a 
principled defence of equity and a statement of faith in the fairness of the income tax 
system. The core of a tax debt – the tax assessed itself – is only compromised under 
extraordinary circumstances with a remission order, in the context of bankruptcy 
proceedings where all debts may be compromised, or to the limited extent that a waiver 
or cancellation of interest allows its value to depreciate over time. The strictness of these 
rules provides some comfort that the income tax is being applied to all in an even-handed 
way.  
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Where the tax administration has been willing to admit that unfairness exists in 
the tax system, and so provisions in the fairness package are needed, administrative 
measures like deadlines and penalties are to blame; the underlying tax assessment is still 
thought of as fair. Even where interest and penalties are forgiven, the administration 
prefers to label it relief that a taxpayer might need, rather than view the forgiveness as 
mitigating unfairness caused by the normal operation of the tax system. 
 Tax disputes may be settled extrajudicially, but only on a principled legal basis 
consistent with the application of the law to the facts as the Minister sees them. The 
Minister is not empowered to settle for “litigation risk”, as is sometimes proposed, and so 
we need not confront the spectre of a tax discount for those who can afford to hire the 
best tax litigators.
87
 Two tax litigators for the Department of Justice put it as follows: 
Not only does the minister have a positive duty to ensure 
collection of all tax properly due and owing, but in doing so 
he must treat all taxpayers equitably. A compromise 
settlement that results in an extralegal reduction of the 
liability of one taxpayer will not be consistent with the 
treatment accorded all other taxpayers who are called upon 
to pay their full assessed share.
88
 
However, given that a different path was recommended in the Carter Report, a document 
animated by a fundamental concern for equity in the tax system, I suggest that the notions 
of compromise and forgiveness deserve further consideration. A number of different lines 
of analysis might be pursued in considering the role of compromise in Canadian income 
tax. 
                                                 
87
 See Sandler & Campbell, supra note 9. 
88
 Burns & MacGregor, supra note 67 at 33:9. 
28 
2.5.1 AS AN EQUITY / ADMINISTRABILITY TRADE-OFF 
It is fairly clear that a pragmatic argument can be made in favour of 
compromise.
89
 Allowing the CRA to accept less than the full amount of the liability – 
either in the dispute resolution context or in the collection context – would provide the 
flexibility to spend less on litigation and collection procedures and to maximize the 
revenue collected. Given that pragmatic case, we might reconsider whether some system 
involving compromise might be able to succeed in alleviating our fears about the damage 
to equity that compromise entails. 
The first path would be to accept the premise that compromise decreases the 
equity of the system to some degree. From that starting point, the question is whether a 
compromise system could be designed that would maximize the practical benefits for the 
tax administration while minimizing the damage to equity such that the trade-off would 
be acceptable. For example, compromises of very small amounts might save considerable 
litigation costs while introducing minimal inequity. Similarly, compromises for taxpayers 
who truly can not pay will likely cost little, while saving the costs associated with trying 
to collect those debts.  
2.5.2 AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO EXISTING INEQUITIES 
On the other hand, the uncompromising stance of the current administrative rules 
might be shown to be less equitable in practice than we might hope. There is some 
comfort in the knowledge that settlements of tax disputes must be grounded in the Income 
Tax Act; however, it is difficult to know how many of these settlements are de facto 
compromises for which lawyers were able to find a principled basis. While the resulting 
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settlement must be justifiable on a principled basis, tax litigators for the Department of 




Further, if our concern is the advantage of those with access to professional 
representation, it is unlikely that the principled basis requirement removes this advantage. 
On the contrary, taxpayers might be better able to represent themselves in a 
straightforward give-and-take negotiation than they are in a settlement discussion 
structured around the provisions of Income Tax Act. Professional advisors, on the other 
hand, will have the familiarity with the principled basis requirement and the Income Tax 
Act to enable them to act effectively. That is, the principled basis requirement might be 
argued to increase the value of professional advice and thereby increase the disparity 
between those who have access to good advisors and those who do not. 
If we accept that our uncompromising stance creates, rather than prevents, 
inequities in some cases, then a good argument could be made for a compromise system 
that addresses those cases or moves to counterbalance those inequities. For example, we 
might imagine a system that allows compromises for low income taxpayers to balance the 
advantage that higher income taxpayers have in dealing with the administration. 
Indeed, the wording of the Financial Administration Act recognizes that the 
collection of tax is unreasonable or unjust in some cases. While the Royal Commission 
did not mention the availability of remission orders in discussing its recommendation for 
an offer in compromise procedure, remission orders were a part of the Financial 
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Administration Act when the Carter Report was written and we can safely assume that 
the Commissioners were aware of that. One way to look at the offer in compromise 
recommendation is as a more widely available, more structured, and perhaps more 
controlled version of the remission order. Having recognized that these cases of 
unfairness exist, we can then ask whether a procedure can be designed to identify and 
deal with them rather than relying on the discretion of the federal cabinet. 
Scholars have argued for both the compromise settlement of tax disputes and the 
American offer in compromise procedure as good “second-best” solutions in the non-
ideal worlds of tax litigation and tax collection.
91
 More work needs to be done in thinking 
through the distributive effects of forbidding compromises and in the potential design of 
compromise procedures; however, it is at least conceivable that the inequities in the 
current system are great enough that we would improve the equity of the system by 
allowing compromises in appropriate cases. 
2.5.3 AS PART OF A LARGER EQUITABLE SYSTEM 
Compromises might also be justified as parts of a larger equitable whole. In the 
American context, Shu-Yi Oei has discussed the offer in compromise procedure as part of 
the broader tax system and as part of the social safety net.
92
 If we are willing to consider 
the possibility that there are some other unavoidable inequities in the tax system, 
compromise procedures might be designed to compensate. Thinking even more broadly, 
if the compromise of a tax debt saves a taxpayer from bankruptcy, financial ruin, and 
reliance on Canada’s social safety net, then we might think of a compromise procedure as 
part of that safety net.  
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Looking at the problem from this angle would require a consideration of the 
bigger picture: what is the social safety net and how does it function in theory and 
practice? How would the compromise of tax debts interact with the welfare system? With 
the bankruptcy system? Given these broader considerations, there may be a place for the 
compromise of tax debts to supplement the existing safety net, or as a more efficient way 
of accomplishing the same goals. 
2.6 EXPLORING THE CASE FOR COMPROMISE IN THE CANADIAN TAX 
SYSTEM 
It is unclear whether the offer-in-compromise procedure used in the United States 
would be suitable for Canada, or whether those who worry about the detrimental effects 
to equity and to confidence in the taxation system are correct. There are differences in the 
broader legal context that need to be considered. For example, differences between 
Canadian and American bankruptcy law or differences between the administrative 
structures of the Canada Revenue Agency and the Internal Revenue Service might make 
importing the offer in compromise procedure problematic. 
Similarly, a longer and more detailed consideration might find that the constraints 
on the administration’s power to compromise in settling tax disputes are an invaluable 
safeguard against abuse of power and inequity. What I suggest, however, is that we 
should look more closely at both the theory underlying Canada’s principled and 
uncompromising stance and its practical effects, and that more work can be done to 
question whether alternatives like those recommended in the Carter Report might better 
suit our tax policy goals and our broader social goals. 
In this thesis, I explore the issue from several angles. In chapter 3, I discuss 
administrative processes that each tax system uses in allowing or restraining the 
32 
settlement, compromise, or forgiveness of tax debts. In chapter 4, I add context to the 
discussion by looking at powers given to the tax authorities as creditors. In chapter 5, I 
return to some of the questions posed in this chapter, and look at the case for compromise 
in the Canadian tax system through a tax policy lens. 
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CHAPTER 3:  ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES OF FORGIVENESS 
3.1 FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARISON 
In the second chapter, I explored the history of several administrative processes 
by which Canada allows the forgiveness of tax debts, with some focus on the Carter 
Commission’s recommendation that a version of the offer-in-compromise procedure be 
imported from the United States. I argued that, while Canada’s current stance seems 
designed to further equity in the administration of the tax system, these issues deserve to 
be examined in more detail. 
In this chapter, my goal is largely descriptive. I begin by describing the offer-in-
compromise program as it currently exists in the United States. The program originates in 
legislation that gives the United States Secretary of the Treasury discretion to 
compromise tax debts.
93
 The way that the discretion is exercised – the purposes for which 
it is used, the mechanisms and guidelines that restrict its use, the way that taxpayers 
interact with the administration in seeking this compromise – are fleshed out in a variety 
of places. The regulations developed by the treasury department provide some guidance, 
as do the Internal Revenue Manual, and the prescribed forms for taxpayers.
94
 Aside from 
these internal measures that guide the IRS’s behaviour in the process, there is, in some 
cases, a judicial review process that acts as a check on the IRS’s discretion. 
Canada has nothing similar to the offer-in-compromise program, but does have 
other contexts in which discretion is given to the tax administrators to forgive all or part 
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of a debt arising under the Income Tax Act.
95
 Moreover, areas in which the discretion to 
compromise a debt is withheld may also be fruitful subjects for comparison. To that end, 
I take the same descriptive approach to the forgiveness of penalties and interest under the 
taxpayer relief provisions in the Income Tax Act and to the principled basis requirement 
for the settlement of tax disputes.
96
 I attempt to flesh out the details of these processes 
using a variety of resources, including the Income Tax Act, various publications of the 
Canada Revenue Agency, and the Taxpayer Relief Procedures Manual.
97
 Not all of these 
sources are authoritative “law” in the sense that a court would find them to be binding on 
the taxpayer or the administration. I use them in the discussion here because, whether or 
not they are authoritative or persuasive in a court, they do lay out rules, guidelines, and 
procedures that we can reasonably expect will govern the relationship between the 
taxpayer and the administration in the normal course of events. 
These processes operate in somewhat different contexts, and so a direct 
comparison among them is challenging. In the American tax system, there are procedures 
that more closely resemble the taxpayer relief provisions than the offer-in-compromise 
program does; the offer-in-compromise operates alongside, and not instead of, these 
provisions. Accordingly, my approach in the analysis here is to look at the similarities 
and the differences between the offer-in-compromise program and the Canadian 
processes I discuss with an eye toward explaining the extent to which the two 
jurisdictions attempt to accomplish similar goals with different methods and the extent to 
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which the offer-in-compromise program reveals goals, processes, and methods of 
participation in the tax system that are absent in Canada. 
I suggest that, while there are similarities in the both the goals and the processes 
that I examine, the offer-in-compromise program provides an example of a contractual 
method of ordering the relationship between the administration and the taxpayer that is 
absent in the Canadian system. Even in places where we might expect to find contractual 
ordering, and where the administration might have discretion to engage in some 
bargaining, the Canadian system shows a strong preference for adjudicative processes. 
3.2 OFFER IN COMPROMISE 
 The explicit power to compromise has a long history in the United States. The 
Internal Revenue Code authorizes the IRS and the Department of Justice to make 
compromises in tax cases, and provides a duty to keep records of such compromises: 
(a) Authorization. The Secretary may compromise any 
civil or criminal case arising under the internal revenue 
laws prior to reference to the Department of Justice for 
prosecution or defense; and the Attorney General or his 
delegate may compromise any such case after reference 
to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense. 
 
(b) Record. Whenever a compromise is made by the 
Secretary in any case, there shall be placed on file in the 
office of the Secretary the opinion of the General 
Counsel for the Department of the Treasury or his 
delegate, with his reasons therefor, with a statement of -
- 
(1) The amount of tax assessed, 
(2) The amount of interest, additional amount, 
addition to the tax, or assessable penalty, 
imposed by law on the person against whom the 
tax is assessed, and 
(3) The amount actually paid in accordance with the 
terms of the compromise. 
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Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this 
subsection, no such opinion shall be required with respect 
to the compromise of any civil case in which the unpaid 
amount of tax assessed (including any interest, additional 
amount, addition to the tax, or assessable penalty) is less 
than $50,000. However, such compromise shall be subject 








 While the Code’s language appears to grant wide discretion to make compromises 
(the Secretary or the Attorney General “may compromise any … case”, subject only to 
the requirement to keep a legal opinion on record), the practice has long been to restrict 
the situations in which the IRS has authority to compromise. As early as 1879, the 
position of the Attorney General of the United States was that the power to compromise 
could only be exercised where there was either doubt about the taxpayer’s liability or 
doubt about the collectability of the debt.
100
 The United States Supreme Court has held 
that this provision constitutes the exclusive means of compromising in tax cases, and so 
settlement agreements that fail to comply with the requirements of the provision are 
invalid and unenforceable.
101
 In the regulations, the long standing grounds for 
compromise – doubt as to liability and doubt as to collectability – have been joined by the 
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promotion of effective tax administration.
102
 Any of the grounds may be present to allow 
the administration to enter into a valid compromise. 
 In the IRS’s view, the offer-in-compromise program has four objectives: (1) to 
effect collection of what can reasonably be collected at the earliest possible time and at 
the least cost to the government; (2) to achieve a resolution that is in the best interests of 
both the individual taxpayer and the government; (3) to provide the taxpayer with a fresh 
start toward future voluntary compliance with filing and payment requirements; (4) to 
collect revenue that may not be collected through any other means.
103
 While these four 
goals focus on the bilateral relationship between the IRS and the particular taxpayer in 
question, the current National Taxpayer Advocate adds that the program may have 
beneficial effects for “tax morale”.
104
 That is to say that taxpayer compliance will be 
improved because the offer-in-compromise program increases the perception that “the 
IRS treats taxpayers with courtesy and respect and provides reasonable opportunities to 
resolve a tax liability when [taxpayers] lapse”.
105
 
3.2.1 DOUBT AS TO LIABILITY 
Doubt as to liability stands apart from the other potential grounds of a 
compromise. It requires a reconsideration of the IRS’s assessment of tax during the year 
in question, rather than a consideration of the taxpayer’s current situation and ability to 
meet her obligations. In making an offer, the taxpayer uses a different form and is not 
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required to disclose her financial situation, provide a deposit, or pay an application fee.
106
 




 In the words of the regulations, doubt as to liability exists where there is a 
“genuine dispute as to the existence or amount of the correct tax liability under the law”, 
and not in any case where the liability has already been established by a court decision.
108
 
Generally, a taxpayer uses doubt as to liability to ground a compromise offer where she 
was unable to contest the tax liability within the time allowed.
109
 Form 656-L, which is 
used to make an offer based on doubt as to liability, explains that what is required is a 
written statement of the reasons why the taxpayer doubts the amount of liability together 
with evidence or documentation to allow the IRS to evaluate the claim.
110
 
 IRS officers are directed to treat an offer based on doubt as to liability as they 
would an audit reconsideration.
111
 This includes considering the written submissions, 
documentation, and evidence provided by the taxpayer, and requesting additional 
documents if necessary. Unlike the other two types of offers, which are handled by the 
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There are three possible outcomes of the examination. The offer should be 
accepted if the IRS examiner agrees that the amount offered by the taxpayer is adequate 
considering the degree of doubt established.
113
 To a Canadian audience, this is a striking 
possibility. We would not expect a CRA officer at any level to conclude that there is 
some unresolved or unresolvable doubt as to the liability of a particular taxpayer. Rather, 
the CRA’s approach would be to apply the administration’s interpretation of the law to 
the facts as the CRA understands them, and to rely on the process of objections and 
appeals to make any necessary correction.
114
 As noted above, accepted offers on this 
basis are less common than those based on doubt as to collectability; however, there 
clearly is space in the Internal Revenue Code, the regulations, and the Internal Revenue 
Manual for the IRS to admit doubt regarding the correct tax treatment of a taxpayer.
115
 
 The other two possibilities will appear more familiar to Canadians. If the IRS 
examiner and the taxpayer agree on the correct amount of the liability (which is distinct 
from agreeing that there is doubt regarding the liability), then the offer-in-compromise 
should be withdrawn and an adjustment to the liability will be made.
116
 If the taxpayer 
and the IRS are not able to reach an agreement, the offer is rejected. However, before an 
offer is rejected by the IRS, the examiner sends the file to be reviewed internally by an 
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 When an offer is rejected, the taxpayer has 30 
days to file an administrative appeal which will be heard by the IRS Office of Appeals.
118
  
Generally speaking, there is no review or appeal of the decision of the Office of 
Appeals.
119
 However, where the rejected offer was made as a suggested collection 
alternative at a collection due process hearing, the taxpayer may apply to the United 
States Tax Court for judicial review.
120
 In most cases, the Tax Court is deferential to the 
decision of the IRS, reviewing only for an abuse of discretion.
121
 However, where the 
taxpayer is able to properly put the underlying liability at issue, which may the case if the 
taxpayer had grounds to make an offer based on doubt as to liability, the court will 
conduct a de novo review.
122
  
 Regardless of whether a compromise based on doubt as to liability is reached, the 
taxpayer still has the opportunity to make another offer based on doubt as to 
collectability. This fact highlights the point that a doubt as to liability offer has nothing to 
do with what the taxpayer can afford to pay. To be accepted by the IRS, the amount 
offered should reflect either the taxpayer’s position regarding the correct amount of 
liability or an appreciation of the genuine doubt as to the liability. The taxpayer’s 
financial situation – her ability to pay either the full amount or the compromised amount 
– is not considered at this stage.  
                                                 
117
 IRC § 7122(e)(1). 
118
 IRC § 7122(e)(2); 26 CFR § 301.7122-1(f)(5); IRM, supra note 94, § 4.18.2.8. 
119
 Ibid at § 8.23.1.3. 
120
 IRC § 6320(d)(1). 
121
 Sego v Commissioner, 114 TC 604 (2000); Goza v Commissioner, 114 TC 176 (2000). 
122
 Where a taxpayer had the opportunity to dispute the underlying tax liability, she will be precluded from 
challenging the liability by IRC § 6330(c)(2)(B). For examples of cases in which such a challenge was 
allowed as no notice of statutory deficiency had been received and no previous opportunity to dispute the 
liability had arisen, see: Cotler v Commissioner, TC Memo 2007-283; Molina v Commissioner, TC Memo 
2004-258. 
41 
3.2.2 DOUBT AS TO COLLECTABILITY 
 The most common ground for accepted offers is doubt as to collectability.
123
 In 
evaluating offers made on this basis, the Internal Revenue Code provides that an 
acceptable offer should leave the taxpayer with sufficient resources to provide for basic 
living expenses.
124
 The Code directs the Secretary to publish national and local 
allowances, and to consider, based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case, 
whether those guidelines are applicable. Moreover, the IRS is directed to provide special 
treatment to low-income taxpayers and not to “reject an offer-in-compromise from a low-
income taxpayer solely on the basis of the amount of the offer”.
125
 
According to the regulations, “Doubt as to collectability exists in any case where 
the taxpayer’s assets and income are less than the full amount of the liability.”
126
 Like the 
Internal Revenue Code, the regulations also direct the IRS, when considering an offer 
based on doubt as to collectability, to take into account the taxpayer’s ability to pay and 
to permit the taxpayer to retain funds to pay basic living expenses, considering the 




In making on offer based on doubt as to collectability, the taxpayer must make a 
full and detailed disclosure of her financial situation. The prescribed form requires the 
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taxpayer to disclose information about all of the following: her employment (including 
self-employment) situation; personal assets owned, including bank accounts, life 
insurance policies, real estate, vehicles, other valuable items; household income and 
expenses; secured debts; and, historical information about bankruptcies, lawsuits, and 
transfers of assets for less than full value.
128
 Further, the form asks the taxpayer to attach 
documentation in support of the information provided: recent paystubs, bank statements, 
mortgage statements, and so on.
129
 Taxpayers that are corporations, partnerships, or 




At the end of the form, the taxpayer calculates a “minimum offer amount” based 
on the equity in her assets, her income, and her expenses. This amount is somewhat less 
if the taxpayer proposes to pay the amount within five months, and somewhat more if the 
payment is to be spread over a longer period. This minimum offer amount is referred to 
elsewhere as the “reasonable collection potential”, and, in general, the evaluation of an 
offer based on doubt as to collectability turns on it.
131
 
 According to the Internal Revenue Manual, the reasonable collection potential 
reflects the amount that the IRS would be able to collect, including through the use of 
administrative and judicial collection remedies.
132
 The determination includes a 
projection of the taxpayer’s future ability to pay, taking into account factors such as age, 
health, marital status, dependents, education, training, experience, and employment 
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 If the taxpayer offers an amount equal to or greater than the reasonable 
collection potential, the IRS generally accepts it. 
 It is worth pausing at this point to highlight the fact that the calculation of 
reasonable collection potential – and therefore the acceptability of the offer, in most cases 
– does not depend at all on the amount actually owed by the taxpayer.
134
 Instead, it 
reflects a pragmatic appreciation of the amount that the IRS could expect to collect given 
the taxpayer’s current circumstances.
135
 While the IRS’s decision to accept or reject the 
offer will normally turn on the reasonable collection potential, other factors come into 
play which may sway the decision one way or the other. 
3.2.2.1 PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 Public policy considerations may cause the IRS to refuse an otherwise acceptable 
offer. The Internal Revenue Manual emphasises that these cases should be extremely rare 
and are based on projected public reaction to the compromise. According to the Manual, 
the IRS will exercise discretion to refuse an offer on public policy grounds where “public 
reaction to the acceptance of the offer could be so negative as to diminish future 
voluntary compliance by the general public.”
136
 The standard is not met simply because 
acceptance would generate public interest, including critical public interest, nor is it met 
simply because a taxpayer was prosecuted, including prosecutions for tax violations.
137
 
However, the Manual gives three scenarios that may warrant rejection on these grounds: 
(1) The taxpayer has in the past, and continues to openly 
encourage others to refuse to comply with the tax laws.  
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(2) Indicators exist showing that the financial benefits of a 
criminal activity are concealed or the criminal activity 
is continuing. 
(3) The taxpayer engaged in a pattern of conduct 




Both the general rule that public reaction should be considered and the specific 
examples provide evidence for the argument that the goals of the offer-in-compromise 
program include more than the four goals reproduced from the Internal Revenue Manual 
above. Also included, as the National Taxpayer Advocate says, is the idea that offers-in-
compromise should encourage, or at least not discourage, compliance with the tax 
system. While the four goals deal exclusively with the relationship between the IRS and 
the specific taxpayer in question, some consideration of the broader community does 
come into play. 
3.2.2.2 SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
Special circumstances may lead the IRS to accept an otherwise unacceptable offer 
based on doubt as to collectability. That is, the IRS may compromise a tax debt for less 
than the reasonable collection potential where there are compelling concerns of economic 
hardship, public policy, or equity. These offers are evaluated in the same way that offers 
based on the promotion of effective tax administration are evaluated; the criteria and 
procedures are discussed in more detail below.  
3.2.2.3 POSSIBILITY OF A PARTIAL PAYMENT INSTALLMENT AGREEMENT 
 The IRS will reject a compromise offer where it can reasonably expect to collect 
the full value of the debt, including cases where this can only be accomplished by virtue 
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of an installment agreement.
139
 This is simply an extrapolation of the general rule that 
offers based on doubt as to collectability should only be accepted where doubt as to 
collectability actually exists. 
However, in 2004, Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code to allow the IRS 
to enter into “partial payment installment agreements”: 
The Secretary is authorized to enter into written agreements 
with any taxpayer under which such taxpayer is allowed to 
make payment on any tax in installment payments if the 
Secretary determines that such agreement will facilitate 




The IRS may enter into an installment agreement even where the amount of the 
installments is so low that the full amount of the debt will not be collected before the 
statutory limitation period for collection expires. The advent of this alternative method 
for agreeing to collect a portion of the debt creates an interaction worth exploring 
between installment agreements and offers-in-compromise. 
In evaluating a proposed offer-in-compromise, the IRS official is directed to 
consider whether the taxpayer has the ability to make installment payments, and, if so, 
how much of the debt could be collected before the statute of limitations bars the IRS 
from further collection action.
141
 However, the IRS generally prefers the offer-in-
compromise program, even in some cases where a partial payment installment agreement 
could collect more money. It cites “the benefit to the government of receiving payment at 
an earlier time, the compliance aspect of the [offer-in-compromise], [and] monitoring and 
default issues with a [partial payment installment agreement]” as considerations that 
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generally favour an offer-in-compromise.
142
 However, the IRS also considers “the 
difference between the potential amount received from a PPIA and the tax liability, the 
difference between the potential amount received from a PPIA and the offer amount, the 
taxpayers gross income and family size, and anticipated changes in the taxpayer's income 
or expenses.”
143
 Having considered all of these factors, the IRS may reject an offer-in-
compromise on the basis that a partial payment installment agreement would yield a 
better outcome for the government. 
3.2.3 EFFECTIVE TAX ADMINISTRATION 
 In 1998, in the legislative history of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring 
and Reform Act of 1998, Congress encouraged the IRS to develop offer-in-compromise 
procedures to take into account factors like “equity, hardship, and public policy where a 
compromise … would promote effective tax administration.”
144
 The treasury regulations 
developed in response explain that, where no other ground for compromise exists, the 
IRS may compromise a tax debt to promote effective tax administration.
145
 These 
compromises are distinct from compromises on other grounds in that the tax liability is 
both valid and fully collectable. The IRS may compromise on this ground where full 
collection would cause economic hardship or where the taxpayer identifies “compelling 
public policy or equity considerations” and “demonstrate[s] circumstances that justify 
compromise even though a similarly situated taxpayer may have paid his liability in 
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 The IRS is also called upon to consider the effect that either full collection or 
compromise would have on the public’s perception of the tax system. The regulations 
acknowledge that in some cases, full collection would “undermine public confidence in 
the tax system”.
147
 On the other hand, the IRS is forbidden from compromising to 
promote effective tax administration where the compromise “would undermine 
compliance by taxpayers with the tax laws.”
148
 
 As noted above, the factors discussed below which may ground an offer based on 
the promotion of effective tax administration are the same factors which the IRS will 
consider in evaluating an offer based on doubt as to collectability with special 
circumstances. The difference between a compromise based on doubt as to collectability 
with special circumstances and a compromise based on the promotion of effective tax 
administration is only whether doubt as to collectability exists. The consideration of 
“special circumstances” and the promotion of effective tax administration is the same. 
3.2.3.1 ECONOMIC HARDSHIP 
 The IRS may compromise to accept less than the full amount due where that 
amount could be collected, but the collection would result in economic hardship to the 
taxpayer. The treasury regulations define economic hardship with relation to the payment 
of basic living expenses: 
This [economic hardship] condition applies if satisfaction 
of the levy in whole or in part will cause an individual 
taxpayer to be unable to pay his or her reasonable basic 
living expenses. The determination of a reasonable amount 
for basic living expenses will be made by the director and 
will vary according to the unique circumstances of the 
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individual taxpayer. Unique circumstances, however, do 





Three points worth highlighting in this definition. First, it opens this ground only to 
individuals. Corporations, partnerships, and limited liability companies have no living 
expenses, and so the IRS will not entertain a claim to economic hardship.
150
 Second, the 
IRS is directed to look at the unique circumstances of the individual who seeks the 
compromise. Third, in considering these individual circumstances, only a basic standard 
of living is protected. The IRS will not accept compromises to allow the taxpayer to 
sustain an affluent lifestyle. 
 The regulations provide several examples of the unique factors that can support a 
finding of economic hardship. Economic hardship may be found where a taxpayer’s 
entire income is expected to be exhausted in supporting dependants who have no other 
means of support.
151
 Or, the taxpayer’s assets, while sufficient to pay the tax debt, may be 
needed because of a long-term illness or disability.
152
 Similarly, economic hardship may 
be found where the tax debt could only be satisfied by liquidating an asset that the 
taxpayer depends on to provide a basic standard of living.
153
 
3.2.3.2 PUBLIC POLICY & EQUITY 
The criteria for an acceptable offer based on public policy and equity grounds are 
somewhat less clear. The regulations state that these compromises are justified where the 
collection of the full debt would “undermine public confidence that the tax laws are being 
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administered in a fair and equitable manner.”
154
 The taxpayer in such a case is expected 
to “demonstrate circumstances that justify compromise even though a similarly situated 
taxpayer may have paid his liability in full.”
155
 
The examples in the regulations offer some clarification about what it might mean 
to provide fairness and equity by treating similarly situated taxpayers differently. The 
first supposes that the taxpayer was hospitalized for a serious illness almost continuously 
for several years. Being incapacitated, the taxpayer was unable to manage his financial 
affairs. The example also assumes that the taxpayer’s overall history of compliance with 
the tax system does not weigh against compromise. In the second, the hypothetical 
taxpayer was reasonably diligent, and, again, has a good history of compliance. However, 
due to bad advice received from the IRS, the taxpayer faces a steep tax bill.
156
 
So, we might generally expect that in cases where a taxpayer was incapacitated 
and therefore unable to meet her objections under the Internal Revenue Code or where 
liability is attributable to some delay or error of the IRS, a compromise might be 
appropriate. Elsewhere, the Internal Revenue Code provides relief from penalties and 
interest in the same situations.
157
 The Internal Revenue Manual adds that a compromise 
may be appropriate in the case of a not-for-profit, charitable, or exempt organization 
whose provision of an essential service to the community would be jeopardized by the 
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collection of the full debt, and in cases where the delinquency was caused by the criminal 
or fraudulent actions of a third party.
158
 
3.2.4 ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 Where the process results in the rejection of an offer, the taxpayer has 30 days to 
file an administrative appeal.
159
 The IRS Office of Appeals promises an independent 
review in an “informal administrative forum”.
160
 There is generally no further right to 
appeal or review beyond the Office of Appeals. 
 However, where the offer-in-compromise was made as part of a collection due 
process hearing pursuant to IRC § 6330, the taxpayer may petition the Tax Court for 
review of the administrative appeal decision. The Tax Court will review the rejection of 
the taxpayer’s offer for an abuse of discretion.
161
 This is a reasonably high standard, 
sometimes rephrased as a review of “whether the [IRS’s] determinations were arbitrary, 
capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law.”
162
 Because the standard of review is so 
high, it has been suggested that the availability of judicial review has made it more 
difficult for taxpayers to have their compromise offers accepted.
163
 Moreover, even when 
the Tax Court finds an abuse of discretion in rejecting an offer, it does not conclude that 
the offer ought to have been accepted or make any finding about what an acceptable offer 
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in the circumstances should have been.
164
 While the IRS will be required to reconsider 
the offer, the appeals officer may find other reasons to reject it.
165
 
3.2.5 TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
It is important to note that the taxpayer’s debt will be compromised as a part of an 
accepted offer only if the taxpayer honours the terms and conditions of the offer. The 
required form requires that the taxpayer agree to the following: 
If I fail to meet any of the terms of this offer, the IRS may 
levy or sue me to collect any amount ranging from the 
unpaid balance of the offer to the original amount of the tax 
debt without further notice of any kind. The IRS will 
continue to add interest, as Section 6601 of the Internal 
Revenue Code requires, on the amount the IRS determines 
is due after default. The IRS will add interest from the date 




 For offers based on doubt as to liability, relatively little is required of the 
taxpayer. The taxpayer is required to consent to the extension of various time limitations 
on the IRS while the offer is being considered, to waive any right to contest the tax debt 




 For offers based on doubt as to collectability or the promotion of effective tax 
administration, much more is required of the taxpayer. The taxpayer is required to make a 
payment immediately to have the offer considered – 20% of the total offer value if the 
offer is to be paid in 5 for fewer monthly payments (called a “lump sum payment”), or 
the first monthly payment if the offer is to be paid over a longer period (called “periodic 
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payment”). In the case of periodic payment, the taxpayer is required to continue making 
the monthly payments while the offer is being considered.
168
 If the offer is ultimately not 
accepted, the payments made will be kept by the IRS and applied to the taxpayer’s 
debt.
169
 The taxpayer also agrees to remain in compliance – filing returns and paying 
taxes – for a five year period after the offer is accepted.
170
 As the offer form makes clear 
to the taxpayer, any material breach of the compliance term may result in the IRS 
pursuing collection of the entire debt. 
3.3 TAXPAYER RELIEF (INTEREST AND PENALTIES) 
 As discussed briefly in Chapter 2, the Income Tax Act provides no discretion to 
allow the CRA to compromise tax assessed. However, many of the goals of the offer-in-
compromise program are shared by the taxpayer relief provisions, under which the CRA 
is empowered to waive or cancel penalties or interest and offer other relief from various 
deadlines. The CRA explains its view of the taxpayer relief provisions as follows: 
The legislation gives the CRA the ability to administer the 
income tax system fairly and reasonably by helping 
taxpayers to resolve issues that arise through no fault of 
their own, and to allow for a common-sense approach in 
dealing with taxpayers who, because of personal misfortune 
or circumstances beyond their control, could not comply 




 Moreover, the administrative mechanism that deals with the taxpayer relief 
provisions is somewhat similar to that of the offer-in-compromise program, and the 
criteria on which applications for relief are judged bear some resemblance to those on 
which the more rare compromise offers are judged. In the CRA’s view, the circumstances 
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that may justify relief from interest and penalties will generally fall under three broad 
categories (though relief may be granted in other situations as well): extraordinary 
circumstances, actions of the CRA, and inability to pay or financial hardship.
172
 
3.3.1 EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES 
 Relief from interest and penalties may be granted where they result from 
extraordinary circumstances beyond the taxpayer’s control.
173
 The form used in requests 
for taxpayer relief offers the following as examples of extraordinary circumstances, in 
addition to the option of writing in a different extraordinary circumstance: “natural or 
man-made disaster”; “death/accident/serious illness/emotional or mental distress”; and, 
“civil disturbance”.
174
 What is imagined here is a flood, fire, death in the immediate 
family, or a major disruption in services that may prevent taxpayers from meeting their 
obligations under the Income Tax Act.
175
 In these cases, Canada’s position is not that any 
part of the tax debt should be compromised, but that a “common-sense approach” would 
not require taxpayers to pay penalties and interest. 
 The Taxpayer Relief Procedures Manual directs CRA officers to look fairly 
closely at these requests and to grant relief only to the extent that the taxpayer’s default 
was actually caused by the extraordinary circumstances described. The taxpayer is asked 
to provide supporting documentation, such as police or fire reports, insurance statements, 
doctors’ notes or death certificates, to explain how the event prevented compliance, and 
to describe what other means the taxpayer pursued in order to remain compliant.
176
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3.3.2 ACTIONS OF THE CRA 
 Relief from interest and penalties may also be granted where the interest and 
penalties arise primarily because of errors or delays of CRA. These may include errors in 
processing a taxpayer’s return, in publically available material, or in information given 
directly to a taxpayer. Similarly, delays in processing a return, completing an audit, or 




 The Taxpayer Relief Procedures Manual directs officers to be similarly thorough 
in evaluating claims made by taxpayers to ensure both a) that the taxpayer’s default was a 
direct result of some delay or error of CRA, and b) to ensure that the delay or error was 
not attributable to incorrect information provided by the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s own 
lateness.
178
 However, CRA officials are also encouraged to proactively identify situations 
which may be appropriate for relief. For example, where the CRA takes an unduly long 
time completing an audit or resolving an objection, relief from penalties and interest may 
be offered without a request being made.
179
 
3.3.3 INABILITY TO PAY / FINANCIAL HARDSHIP 
 The CRA makes clear in IC-07 that it will rarely consider financial hardship as a 
ground for the forgiveness of penalties in the absence of the kind of extraordinary 
circumstances discussed above.
180
 However, it does indicate its willingness to waive or 
cancel interest where it is able to confirm that a taxpayer is unable to pay. The examples 
that CRA provide to illustrate when this may be appropriate bear some resemblance to 
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situations considered under the offer-in-compromise program. Where a taxpayer’s 
inability to pay has already led to collection being suspended or arranged via an extended 
payment arrangement, the CRA may waive interest.
181
 Or, where payment of the 
accumulated interest would cause a “prolonged inability to provide basic necessities”, 
cancelling all or part of the interest may be appropriate.
182
 
 Unlike the situation in the United States, in Canada it is usually only interest, not 
taxes or penalties, that the administration will consider forgiving. However, the CRA 
leaves open the possibility of an “exceptional situation” in which penalties may be 
cancelled in whole or in part. The example given is of a business whose survival is vital 
to the welfare of the community as a whole:  
For example, when a business is experiencing extreme 
financial difficulty, and enforcement of such penalties 
would jeopardize the continuity of its operations, the jobs 
of the employees, and the welfare of the community as a 





 In support of a claim for financial hardship, the taxpayer is asked to make a “full 
financial disclosure”, and, while that might be relatively clear, the CRA provides 
significantly less direction to taxpayers and transparency in its decision making than the 
IRS’s Form 433-A and Form 433-B do. The CRA suggests the following for financial 
disclosure: 
Supporting documents could include financial statements 
(an income and expense statement, assets and liabilities 
statement), current mortgage statement and property 
assessment, loans and monthly bills, bank statements for 
                                                 
181




 Ibid at para 28. 
56 
three months, current investment statements, copies of 




Perhaps because of the rarity of this basis for relief, the CRA has not developed a more 
detailed form to guide taxpayers in making this financial disclosure or to explain how the 
information will be used in making a decision. 
3.3.4 ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Although there is no statutory avenue to appeal a decision regarding taxpayer 
relief, the CRA does grant a second administrative review where a taxpayers request has 
been denied or only partially granted.
185
 In requesting a second review, the taxpayer is 
asked to explain why she disagrees with the conclusions of the first decision and to 
provide any further evidence that might support her claim.
186
 The second-level review 
will be conducted by a CRA official who was not involved in the first decision.
187
  
If the request is rejected again, there is no further appeal (meaning that no other 
body will consider the facts and law de novo), however, the taxpayer may apply for 
judicial review in the Federal Court. Prior to 2005, the court would frequently apply the 
“patent unreasonableness” standard in reviewing the Minister’s decisions under what 
were then called the fairness provisions.
188
 However, a 2005 decision of the Federal 
Court of Appeal said clearly that the correct standard of review was reasonableness 
simpliciter, and a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada made the question 
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moot by removing reasonableness simpliciter and patent unreasonableness from the 




The reasonableness standard, contrasted with the correctness standard, requires 
that the reviewing court show deference to the administrative decision maker. It calls on 
courts to acknowledge that in some cases a range of conclusions or actions will be 
reasonable and to respect the fact that the legislature has placed the decision in the hands 
of the administrative body, which may have considerable expertise.
190
 Fleshing the 
concept out in the context of the review of decisions to deny the waiver or cancellation of 
interest and penalties under subsection 220(3.1) of the Income Tax Act, the Federal 
Courts have shown that they will look for a degree of transparency, justification, and 
intelligibility that render the decision reasonable.
191
 While the standard calls for some 
deference, taxpayers have been successful where the CRA’s decision is based on factual 
or legal errors.
192
  Courts can also be expected to intervene where the second-level review 
is undertaken by a decision-maker who was involved in the first review.
193
 However, the 
reasonableness standard demands that the court recognize that a range of decisions are 
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open to the administration, and so the court will usually refer the matter back to the 
Minister for reconsideration rather than substituting its judgement for the CRA’s.
194
  
3.4 PRINCIPLED BASIS SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
 Some of the history leading up to the crystallization of the principled basis 
doctrine for the settlement of tax litigation was reviewed in Chapter 2. Unlike the cases of 
the offer-in-compromise program in the United States and the application of the taxpayer 
relief provisions in Canada, there are no detailed published guidelines for tax 
administrators to follow in carrying out these negotiations. As a result, much of what we 
can learn about principled basis negotiation comes from anecdotes and from the relatively 
rare cases in which the parties needed a court to enforce the agreement reached. The 
principled basis doctrine offers a Canadian contrast for the offer-in-compromise program 
that exists in the United States, and which the Carter Report recommended be imported 
into Canada. 
 The Income Tax Act provides for extrajudicial settlement of appeals as follows: 
Notwithstanding section 152 [which provides the 
Minister’s assessment powers], for the purpose of disposing 
of an appeal made under a provision of this Act, the 
Minister may at any time, with the consent in writing of the 
taxpayer, reassess tax, interest, penalties or other amounts 




The Minister’s ability to settle is not limited to looking at the issues or the years under 
appeal, and it may include the reassessment of any amounts payable under the Income 
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Tax Act, including taxes, interest, and penalties.
196
 However, as broad as the wording 
might seem, it does not empower the CRA to enter into compromise agreements. 
 In Chapter 2, I raised questions about the extent to which we should expect the 
spirit of the principled basis doctrine to be respected in practice. Where there are 
imaginative and motivated lawyers on both sides, we might expect to see compromise 
agreements “in the guise of so-called ‘adjustments’”.
197
 Professionally advised taxpayers 
may prepare both their filing positions and their positions during the administrative 
objection and appeals process with an eye toward facilitating a principled basis 
settlement.
198
  Moreover, oversight of the process only happens in public where one side 
seeks to repudiate the agreement and the other needs to have it enforced by a court, so it 
is difficult to judge the effectiveness of this restraint on the Minister’s power to 
compromise. 
 These questions are worth exploring; however, it is probably safe to assume that 
letter of the rule are respected in nearly all cases and that the principle is respected in 
most cases. Most tax disputes are resolved without the assistance of tax lawyers. Even at 
the Tax Court level, many cases proceed with the taxpayer representing him- or herself 
and with a relatively inexperienced lawyer representing the Crown. These are less likely 
to be cases of savvy taxpayers who have taken positions with an eye toward conceding 
them or where a great deal of ingenuity has been brought to bear in striking a 
compromise that fits within the confines of the Income Tax Act. 
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3.5 LESSONS FROM THE COMPARISON 
 The above discussion reveals several similarities between the offer-in-
compromise program and the Canadian laws that allow for settlement or forgiveness of 
tax debts. There are similar goals, similar concerns, and similar procedures. In this 
section, I begin by exploring ways in which aspects of the offer-in-compromise program 
are reflected in Canadian law.  Following that, I draw from Lon Fuller’s work in 
distinguishing different processes of ordering social relationships and suggest that the 
offer-in-compromise program allows for a contractual form of ordering.
199
 I suggest that 
this type of engagement between the tax authority and the taxpayer is almost entirely 
absent in the Canadian system. The offer-in-compromise program allows for what might 
be thought of as consensual, horizontal, or reciprocal ordering between the taxpayer and 
the administration, and creates a relationship by which the taxpayer participates in the 
process through bargaining. In contrast, the Canadian system almost exclusively uses 
adjudicative processes, including in situations in which bargaining might be expected and 
those in which the Minister might have some discretion to bargain. 
3.5.1 ECHOS OF THE OFFER-IN-COMPROMISE PROGRAM IN CANADIAN LAW 
 The goals of the offer-in-compromise based on the promotion of effective tax 
administration are echoed in some of the discussions of the Canadian taxpayer relief 
provisions. The IRS’s ability to accept offers to promote effective tax administration was 
added to allow it to accept offers where there is no doubt as to the underlying liability and 
no doubt that the debt could be collected in full, but where the forgiveness of part of the 
debt would promote effective tax administration because “either (1) collection of the 
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liability would create economic hardship, or (2) compelling public policy or equity 
considerations provide sufficient basis for a compromise.”
200
 
 The taxpayer relief provisions were enacted in part to remedy “Revenue Canada’s 
abuse of Canadian taxpayers”.
201
 They do this by giving “the CRA the ability to 
administer the income tax system fairly and reasonably”.
202
 In other words, the main 
thrust of the taxpayer relief provisions is to engender faith in the fairness of the tax 
administration.  
 Both jurisdictions grant this relief in cases of economic hardship. In the United 
States, economic hardship for the purposes of an offer to promote effective tax 
administration is defined based the ability to pay “reasonable basic living expenses”.
203
 In 
Canada, a taxpayer’s accumulated interest charges may be forgiven where “payment of 
the accumulated interest would cause a prolonged inability to provide basic 
necessities”.
204
 Canada also may forgive interest and penalties in cases where the interest 
and penalties were caused by extraordinary circumstances or actions of the CRA.
205
 The 
provisions are also described as “helping taxpayers resolve issues that arise through no 
fault of their own”.
206
 This language might also be a fair description of the many of the 
situations in which the IRS will accept an offer on public policy or equity grounds, such 
as liability caused by errors or delays of the IRS, criminal or fraudulent actions of a third 
party, or inability to comply because of serious illness.
207
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3.5.2 ADJUDICATIVE VERSUS CONTRACTUAL ORDERING 
 One way to think about the difference between the Canadian and American 
approaches is in terms of the different modes of ordering the relationship between the 
taxpayer and the administration. While none of the three examples look purely like a 
contractual bargaining process or like a pure adjudicative process, looking at the 
distinctions between different forms of ordering may reveal something about the way that 
we see the relationship between taxpayers and the tax administration. 
 Lon Fuller explained the value of contractual bargaining as follows: “The special 
virtue of contract lies in its capacity to increase human satisfactions through an exchange, 
as where A has something B wants, B has something A wants, and an exchange will 
increase the satisfactions of both A and B”.
208
 Superficially, both the offer in compromise 
procedure and principled basis settlements seem to be designed to take advantage of this 
special virtue and to leave both the taxpayer and the tax administration better off. 
However, two important questions arise. First, do the constraints on the process seriously 
limit the value of contractual ordering in this case? Second, in this bargaining process, 
what exactly does the tax administration value, and what should it value? 
3.5.2.1 CONSTRAINTS ON THE BARGAINING PROCESS 
 The offer-in-compromise program, by legislative mandate, uses a very structured 
process. The Internal Revenue Code directs the Secretary to prescribe standard guidelines 
for the evaluation of offers and to publish tables of what the IRS should consider to be 
basic living expenses in most cases.
209
 As a result, the forms are fairly direct, and the 
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process is fairly predictable and transparent. The taxpayer proceeds by finding the values 
of her assets, looking at her income and living expenses, and arriving at an amount that 
she can pay the government while still being able to meet her basic needs and earn a 
living. While this structure does impose some limits on the freedom of taxpayers and the 
IRS to take full advantage of the negotiating process by constructing novel or innovative 
agreements, it is worth noting that the IRS does understand the government to be gaining 
when a compromise is reached.
210
  
 The principled basis doctrine makes the extrajudicial settlement of tax debts in 
Canada even more constrained. While the Minister does not have quite the same 
restrictions as the court would in resolving an appeal, she is equally bound to apply the 
law. The CRA can certainly be said to gain when the taxpayer withdraws an appeal as 
part of an extrajudicial settlement of the dispute – the government is spared the time and 
expense of litigation, and it may be able to collect the debt sooner. However, the CRA is 
forbidden from offering any compromise in order to achieve that gain, and so it is 
difficult to think of that process as a real negotiation. 
 While the details of the offer-in-compromise program do constrain bargaining, the 
contrast with a principled basis negotiation shows that it does retain many properties of a 
contractual negotiation. The IRS invites offers with certain characteristics, and when the 
offers come it evaluates them based on those criteria and its perception of its best 
interests. In contrast, the CRA’s ability to settle depends on the taxpayer presenting 
evidence and argument to change the Agency’s view of the situation. While the CRA 
stands to gain somewhat from settling the dispute without litigation, this is a secondary 
(or tertiary) concern. 
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 This view of the constraints on the process is confirmed by the way in which the 
courts treat the two kinds of agreements. In the United States, an offer-in-compromise is 
simply a contract, and the normal federal laws of contract apply.
211
 In Canada, a 
settlement agreement is only valid and enforceable if it represents the application of the 
Income Tax Act to the facts as the CRA understands them.  
This conditional validity undermines the idea that a Canadian settlement should 
be thought of as a contract in the usual sense. As Fuller writes:  
If we asked one party to the contract, “Can you defend that 
contract?” he might answer, “Why, yes. It was good for me 
and it was good for him.” If we then said, “But that is not 
what we meant. We meant, can you defend it on general 
grounds?” he might well reply that he did not know what 
we were talking about. Yet this is precisely the kind of 





In Canada, taxpayers can only enter into settlement agreements with the Crown with the 
expectation that they may be called upon to justify the agreement, not only on the basis 
that each side agreed to the settlement and that it improves the position of both sides, but 
on the basis that the settlement represents a legitimate application of the Income Tax Act. 
For the contract to be valid, it needs more than the consent of both parties free of duress, 
misrepresentation, or mistake, and so on. It requires that the settlement represent an 
outcome that the Tax Court, applying the Income Tax Act, might have reached if the 
appeal had gone ahead. 
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3.5.2.2 THE TAX ADMINISTRATION’S INTERESTS 
 Looking at the question another way, the effect of the principled basis doctrine is 
that the Minister has no interest in compromise. Rather, the Minister’s primary and 
overriding interest is in the correct application of the taxing statute. In those terms, not 
only does the Minister have nothing to give in a negotiation, but the Minister is not 
permitted to place much value on what she might gain. 
 To continue drawing from Fuller’s categori ation of social ordering devices, 
principled basis negotiation looks more like adjudication. That is, “a process of decision 
in which the affected party’s participation consists of an opportunity to present proofs 
and reasoned arguments”.
213
 To further clarify the distinction between contractual 
ordering and adjudication, Fuller writes: “When I am entering a contract with another 
person I may present proofs and arguments to him, but there is generally no formal 
assurance that I will be given this opportunity or that he will listen to my arguments if I 
make them.”
214
 In a principled basis negotiation, the taxpayer is guaranteed not only the 
opportunity to present evidence and reasoned argument, but the promise is that Minister 
can be swayed by nothing else. 
 On the other hand, the statutory discretion to compromise leads to a situation 
where the IRS can bargain with an interest in collecting the most money, at the earliest 
possible time, at the least cost.
215
 So, while the bargaining process is structured, and 
while the IRS agents evaluate the taxpayer’s offer and respond to evidence and argument, 
the offer-in-compromise program creates something more like a real negotiation in that 
each side stands to gain something that it values. 
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3.5.2.3 USE OF THE DISCRETIONARY TAXPAYER RELIEF PROVISIONS 
 If we were to find contractual ordering in Canada’s tax system, the extrajudicial 
settlement of disputes is one place that we might expect to find it. However, in this arena, 
I suggest that the tax administration’s commitment to adjudicative processes extends 
even beyond what is strictly required by the law. To illustrate this point, we can consider 
again the Minister’s power to cancel or waive penalties and interest. The Income Tax Act 
provides the power as follows: 
The Minister may, on or before the day that is ten calendar 
years after the end of a taxation year of a taxpayer (or in the 
case of a partnership, a fiscal period of the partnership) or 
on application by the taxpayer or partnership on or before 
that day, waive or cancel all or any portion of any penalty 
or interest otherwise payable under this Act by the taxpayer 
or partnership in respect of that taxation year or fiscal 
period, and notwithstanding subsections 152(4) to (5), any 
assessment of the interest and penalties payable by the 
taxpayer or partnership shall be made that is necessary to 





Aside from the 10 year limitation period, there is no statutory restriction on the Minister’s 
power to forgive interest and penalties. 
 Accordingly, the legal rationale behind the principled basis doctrine – that the 
Minister has no statutory authority to compromise a tax assessment – does not hold to the 
extent that the assessment in question includes penalties or interest. While the Minister 
would, in any case, have the same public law duties as any other public decision maker, it 
is not at all clear that these would prevent the Minister from exercising the powers given 
to her in subsection 220(3.1) of the Income Tax Act as part of the extrajudicial settlement 
of a tax dispute. 
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 However, the Taxpayer Relief Procedures Manual expressly forbids using the 
taxpayer relief provisions as part of a settlement: “The taxpayer relief provisions were not 
intended and should not be used as a way to negotiate settlement of a taxpayer's account. 
In all circumstances, taxpayer relief requests should be reviewed independently.” So, 
even if the statute might allow the CRA to use the taxpayer relief provisions negotiating a 
settlement in either the collections context or the dispute resolution context – giving the 
CRA, effectively, one chip to bargain with – the Minister’s position is that the taxpayer 
relief provisions were not intended for that purpose and should not be used that way. 
3.5.2.4 IMPLICATIONS OF CANADA’S RELIANCE ON ADJUDICATIVE PROCESSES 
 It is worth repeating that, on the whole, the contrast between Canada’s system and 
that of the U.S. is not as stark as the labels “contractual” and “adjudicative” might 
suggest. In general, the U.S. tax system, like Canada’s, relies heavily on adjudicative 
processes. The IRS makes determinations about tax liability, taxpayers contest those 
determinations in the Tax Court, and taxpayers participate in all of those processes by 
presenting evidence and making reasoned arguments. Moreover, the offer-in-compromise 
program has adjudicative elements. 
 However, its contractual elements do serve to highlight the Canadian system’s 
reliance on adjudicative processes. In thinking about the implications of this heavy 
reliance on adjudication, Fuller’s work is informative. While Fuller recognizes the 
difficulty in distinguishing between horizontal and vertical ordering processes, 
contractual ordering is one of the prototypical examples of horizontal ordering.
217
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Adjudicative processes, on the other hand, are more indicative of imposition of the law 
from above.  
 Accordingly, it may be meaningful that the IRS attempts to turn non-compliant 
taxpayers into compliant ones by having them participate in a bargaining process. The 
different type of participation and different mode of relationship between the taxpayer 
and the administration does sometimes succeed in helping people become compliant 
taxpayers. Indeed, much of the criticism of the offer-in-compromise program in the 
United States argues that not enough compromises are accepted because the guidelines 
are too strict or because IRS officers are resistant to compromise.
218
 
 In Canada, however, the prevailing opinion seems to be that adjudicative 
processes safeguard the integrity of the system, and, that compliance with and faith in the 
tax system might be detrimentally affected if the tax authorities were permitted to 
compromise. Accordingly, taxpayers are left primarily with the presentation of evidence 
and argument as their way of interacting with the tax system. 
3.6 CANADA ESCHEWS CONTRACTUAL ORDERING IN THE TAX SYSTEM 
 In this Chapter, my goals were to describe in detail the administrative processes 
that implement the offer-in-compromise program, that control the exercise of the 
taxpayer relief provisions, and that govern the extrajudicial settlement of tax disputes. 
These processes do not form a complete picture of tax collection or dispute resolution in 
either jurisdiction, but they do help in illustrating some of the similarities and differences 
in approaches that the two jurisdictions take to the settlement, compromise, and 
forgiveness of debts arising within the tax system. 
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 I have argued that the Canadian system shows a strong preference for adjudicative 
processes while the American system allows for some contractual bargaining between the 
taxpayer and the tax authority. The American tax authority sees itself as having 
something valuable to gain through bargaining: the collection of more money, more 
quickly, at less cost. American policy makers appear to hope that the bargaining process 
can engage otherwise unengaged taxpayers and that the “fresh start” offered by the partial 
forgiveness of a tax debt can help non-compliant taxpayers become compliant. The 
Canadian system, on the other hand, shows a belief that adjudicative processes are vital to 
the integrity of the tax system or the top-down authority of tax law. 
 Both the detailed description of the procedures and the insights gleaned from the 
work of Lon Fuller on social ordering processes are revisited in Chapter 5. There, I 
consider the implications of the procedural choices made from the point of view of tax 
policy. Here the discussion focused on the processes themselves and the ways in which 
taxpayers might participate in the tax system. However, thinking about these processes 
and modes of ordering the relationship will also be useful in the consideration of how the 
ideas of settlement, compromise, and forgiveness interact with the tax policy notions of 
equity, neutrality, and administrability. 
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CHAPTER 4:  TAX ADMINISTRATION AS CREDITOR 
In the previous two chapters, I suggested that there are significant differences 
between the attitudes and approaches of Canada and the United States to the settlement, 
compromise, and forgiveness of tax debts. The American tax system allows the tax 
administration to compromise. It allows the taxpayer to participate in the tax system in 
different ways with the goal of repairing the relationship and bringing the non-compliant 
taxpayer into compliance with the requirements of the tax system. On the other hand, 
Canada’s tax system – both in its positive law and in the way in which the tax 
administration exercises its discretion – views most compromise or forgiveness as 
inimical to the integrity of the tax system and the goal of equity between taxpayers. 
The discussion thus far has also suggested an historical contrast between the two 
jurisdictions. The power to compromise has always existed in the American tax system. 
In Canada, there may have been some compromise in practice prior to the mid-1970s; 
however, the view that this practice was illegitimate was crystalized in the Federal Court 
of Appeal’s decision in Galway.
219
 By now it is trite law that the administration has no 
power to do anything other than apply the taxing statute to the facts as it understands 
them. 
In the third chapter, I acknowledged that one significant problem in comparing 
these processes across the two jurisdictions is the differing contexts. There are social 
differences between Canada and the United States, situational differences between the 
dispute resolution context and the collections context, and differences in the legal 
                                                 
219
 Galway (FCA) 2, supra note 41. 
71 
contexts in which tax debts are collected in Canada and the United States. In this chapter, 
my goal is to flesh out some of the context regarding tax debts in the two jurisdictions. 
The context that I examine in this chapter is the privileged position of the tax 
authority in debtor-creditor relations in the two jurisdictions. The way that the tax 
authority operates as a creditor is important because it forms the backdrop for any 
settlement, compromise, or forgiveness that takes place in the tax system. Understanding 
the tax authority’s powers in debtor-creditor law might help in formulating an 
explanation of the incentives that the tax authority has to compromise and the motivation 
that policy makers have to build forgiveness into the tax system.  
In this chapter, I look at the statutory collection powers given to the tax 
administration and the positions that the CRA and the IRS are afforded in bankruptcy 
proceedings. Both tax authorities have ample statutory powers to enable them to collect 
tax debts quickly and at low cost. The IRS arguably has a stronger overall position in 
bankruptcy proceedings, although Canadian law’s strong protection for the Crown’s 
interest in employees’ source deductions is significant. However, any conclusion based 
on this comparison will necessarily be tentative. While looking at these two main features 
of the tax debt collection landscape should give a reasonable idea of the context, the full 
comparative picture of tax collection would include many other factors. Various 
differences in creditors’ rights and remedies in the relevant provincial and state regimes 
can affect the collection of debts, as may the rules governing various corporate forms at 
either the national or sub-national levels, the marital property regimes in the two 
countries, and the less formalized – but perhaps no less powerful – controls that culture 
and politics place on aggressive tax collection. 
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 Nevertheless, the consideration of statutory collection powers and rules applicable 
to tax claims in bankruptcy allows me to draw some conclusions. An explanation of the 
differences between the jurisdictions that relies on the incentives created by the tax 
authority’s position as a creditor is unlikely to be persuasive. The CRA has a strong 
position as a creditor, but this can not completely explain the different attitudes towards 
compromise in the two jurisdictions because the IRS has a similarly strong position. 
Rather, consideration of the treatment of tax claims in the bankruptcy regimes suggests a 
different explanation: both jurisdictions choose to forgive tax debts in appropriate 
situations, and one key difference between them is where the decision is made. Canadian 
law and practice denies the tax authority the power to compromise, settle, or forgive, 
effectively delegating that task to the bankruptcy system. In American law, decision 
making around compromise is concentrated in the tax system and, to some extent, taken 
away from the bankruptcy system. 
4.1 KEY STATUTORY COLLECTION POWERS 
4.1.1 UNITED STATES: LIEN & LEVY 
The Internal Revenue Code provides the IRS with a number of collection powers 
aimed at collecting tax debts quickly and efficiently. The federal tax lien is chief among 
these, providing a basis for a secured interest in a tax debtor’s property. In addition to the 
lien, the IRS has an extrajudicial levy power and, in some cases, the ability to collect tax 
debts from third parties. 
4.1.1.1 FEDERAL TAX LIEN 
The centrepiece of the IRS’s collection powers is the federal tax lien. The lien 
arises automatically and encumbers all of a tax debtor’s property: 
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If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to 
pay the same after demand, the amount (including any 
interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable 
penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition 
thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all 
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, 




In the words of the tenth circuit court of appeals, this provision “is broad and 
comprehensive and [includes] all of a taxpayer's property, except that specifically exempt 
to the payment of taxes.”
221
 The lien comes into existence when the assessment is made 
and remains in effect until the debt is paid, the limitation period for the collection of the 
debt expires, or the IRS releases the lien.
222
 
 While the lien exists immediately upon assessment, the Internal Revenue Code 
also provides for notice of the lien to be filed and to be given to the taxpayer directly.
223
 
Notice of the lien must be filed before the lien will be valid against a purchaser or the 
holder of a security interest, mechanic’s lien, or judgment lien.
224
 Filing of the notice 
happens according to the filing systems established by the states in which the property is 
situated, so a single lien may require filing in several different jurisdictions.
225
 For these 
purposes, personal property, including intangible property, is deemed to be located at the 
taxpayer’s residence, but notice for real property should be given in the state where the 
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 Accordingly, notice of a lien may need to be filed the state in 
which the taxpayer resides and each state in which the taxpayer owns real property in 
order to ensure that the government’s interests are properly protected. Once notice of the 
lien has been filed, notice must also be given directly, in writing, to the tax debtor.
227
 
That notice informs the debtor of the amount of the debt, of her right to request a hearing, 
and of any available administrative appeals.
228
 
 Perhaps because of the complexities of the filing process, tax liens are not 
automatically filed. In the 2012 fiscal year, there were more than 8.1 million new 
delinquent accounts and an inventory of 11.4 million delinquent accounts at the end of 
the year.
229
 In the same year, however, only slightly more than 700,000 notices of federal 
tax liens were filed.
230
 Generally, the decision to file a notice hinges on whether the IRS 
believes that the taxpayer has sufficient assets to justify the cost of filing.
231
 
Even where a lien has been filed, the Internal Revenue Code protects the interests 
of certain other creditors against the potential effects of the lien.
232
 Some commercial 
financing arrangements and security interests will be protected where the transaction was 
agreed to in writing before the notice was filed.
233
 Moreover, ten classes of interests are 
protected against the tax lien regardless of timing.
234
 Among those who receive this 
protection are purchasers of securities and motor vehicles without actual notice of the tax 
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lien, attorneys with liens, holders of mechanic’s liens with respect to real property, and 
public authorities holding liens to secure payment of real property tax, special 




 In addition to the federal tax lien, the IRS is given the power to seize and sell a 
tax debtor’s assets. While both this “levy” power and the federal tax lien involve the use 
of the taxpayer’s property to satisfy a tax debt, the levy does not depend on the lien, and 
the levy power is distinct from a foreclosure on the lien.
236
 The IRS has the power to 
seize and sell a taxpayer’s assets even if the lien has been relinquished.
237
 
 The statute allows the levy only 10 days after the IRS demands payment of the 
debt and 30 days after a notice of intent to levy and a notice of the right to a collection 
due process hearing are sent by registered mail, delivered in person, or left at the usual 
dwelling place or place of business of the tax debtor.
238
 However, both the 10 day and 30 
day notice periods can be waived where the IRS determines that the delay will jeopardize 
the collection of the tax.
239
 The notice of intent to levy sets out the provisions and 
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procedures related to the levy and sale of property, including available administrative 
appeals and alternatives that might prevent the levy.
240
 
 The IRS’s levy power includes authority to seize any property or rights to 
property, and make repeated seizures until the debt is fully paid.
241
 The levy may be 
made by serving a notice of levy on a third party to allow the IRS to seize directly a 
taxpayer’s receivables, bank accounts, or wages; however, the levy generally extends 
only to property possessed and obligations which exist at the time of the levy.
242
 So, a 
levy against a bank account is satisfied by the balance at the time of the levy, and a fresh 
levy will be required to seize future deposits. 
 Several exemptions are carved out of the general rule that any property owned by 
a tax debtor may be subject to an IRS levy. The exemptions are generally geared toward 
allowing the taxpayer to provide a basic standard of living for her family and enjoy the 
benefits of some government programs. The exempt property includes the following: 
necessary clothing and school books for the taxpayer and her family; limited quantities of 
fuel, provisions, furniture and personal effects in the taxpayer’s household; a limited 
amount of books and tools necessary for the taxpayer’s trade, business, or profession; a 
minimum exemption for salary and wages, plus an additional amount if the taxpayer is 
obliged to make support payments for minor children; unemployment benefits; some 
annuity and pension payments; workmen’s compensation; and, some disability and public 
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 To reinforce the breadth of the levy power, however, the Code 
provides that only the specifically enumerated property is exempt from levy, 
notwithstanding any other law of the United States.
244
 
4.1.1.3 JUDICIAL COLLECTION REMEDIES 
 When the IRS’s administrative collection procedures are unable to satisfy the 
debt, the IRS may turn to the courts for help.
245
 The district courts are given wide 
authority to “render such judgments and decrees as may be necessary or appropriate for 
the enforcement of the internal revenue laws.”
246
 In a review of federal tax collection 
procedures, two Alaska lawyers note that enforcement of the tax lien – that is, foreclosure 
on specific property – is the typical remedy.
247
 However, more exotic measures 
authorized by courts have included a warrant to enter property without the consent of the 
owner and the right to be present at the opening of a safety deposit box.
248
 
 Perhaps more significantly, the federal tax lien protects the government’s interests 
against other creditors who go to court to take collection action against the tax debtor. 
The Internal Revenue Code grants the United States the right to intervene in any civil 
action or suit to assert the tax lien, whether filed or not.
249
 If the court denies the 
application to intervene, the tax lien will not be affected.
250
 Where notice of a tax lien has 
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been properly filed before the law suit commences, the plaintiff has a positive duty to 
enjoin the United States, or else the judgment in the suit will be subject to the lien.
251
 
4.1.1.4 THIRD PARTY LIABILITY 
 The final set of powers to consider in the scope of statutory collection 
mechanisms provides the IRS the ability to collect tax liability from someone other than 
the primary debtor. Both Canada and the U.S. have incorporated into the taxing statute 
some provisions which hold those in control of a corporation responsible for some tax 
liabilities of the corporation. Similarly, fiduciaries or executors of an estate may be held 
liable for tax debts of the estate and those who receive property from a tax debtor may 
find that they receive some of debtor’s liability at the same time. 
4.1.1.4.1 The 100% Penalty for “Trust Fund” Taxes 
 The Internal Revenue Code imposes liability for withholding taxes, such as 
employment taxes withheld by an employer from the wages of its employees, on certain 
responsible persons by using a penalty equal to the full amount not withheld and paid 
over to the IRS.
252
 For most purposes, this penalty is treated as a tax liability of the 
responsible person.
253
 A reading of the provision shows that anyone may be liable where 
she is a “person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax” and she 
“willfully fails” to do so or “willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such 
tax or the payment thereof”.
254
 The first prong of this test is sometimes rephrased as 
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requiring that a “responsible person” be held accountable.
255
 The statute contemplates 
that a responsible person may include an officer or employee of a corporation.
256
 
A number of contextual factors may be relevant in determining whether an 
individual qualifies as a responsible person. Whether a person had significant control 
over the finances of the entity has been said to be “the most critical factor”.
257
 However, 
courts may also consider the duties outlined in corporate bylaws, an individual’s 
authority to sign cheques, status as officer or director, and ability to hire and fire 
employees.
258
 Perhaps the most sensible statement of the test is to look for the “power to 
control the decision-making process by which the employer corporation allocates funds 
to other creditors in preference to its withholding obligations.”
259
 Generally speaking, this 
rule can be expected to ensure that high-level managers are those held responsible; the 
IRS is likely to look first to assign liability to individuals with titles that indicate 
responsibility and those with signing authority.
260
 However, the Internal Revenue 
Manual’s list of potential responsible persons also includes employees, shareholders, 
creditors, and payroll service providers.
261
 
The second requirement – willfulness – requires little more than knowledge that 
federal taxes are not being withheld or paid over. The mere fact that one had a duty to 
remit the taxes to the IRS and was negligent “in failing to ascertain facts regarding a tax 
                                                 
255
 See, for example Hochstein v United States, 900 F (2d) 543 at 548 (2d Cir 1990) [Hochstein]. 
256
 IRC § 6671(b). 
257
 Jones v United States, 33 F (3d) 1137 (9th Cir 1994), citing Hochstein, supra note 255, repeated in 
United States v Chapman, 7 Fed Appx 804 (9th Cir 2001) [Chapman]. 
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 Haffa v United States, 516 F (2d) 931 (7th Cir 1975) at 936. This has been called the “touchstone” for 
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Avoid Going Down with the Ship” (1993) 46:3 Tax Lawyer 801 at 804. 
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 Walker, supra note 259 at 804. 
261
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delinquency” is not sufficient.
262
  owever, “voluntary, conscious and intentional – as 
opposed to accidental” conduct, reckless disregard of the risk that taxes may not be paid, 
or failure to investigate or correct mismanagement may all qualify as willful failure.
263
 
4.1.1.4.2 Fiduciaries and Transferees 
 The Internal Revenue Code allows the IRS to collect taxes from a transferee who 
has received something of value for less than full consideration from a tax debtor.
264
 The 
term “transferee” in this context is defined to include “donee, heir, legatee, devisee, and 
distributee”, and so may cover a variety of circumstances in which property changes 
hands.
265
 In the IRS’s view, it may apply to anyone who receives assets “for less than 
full, fair and adequate consideration”.
266
 Transferees can be held liable for the income 




 A fiduciary who allows distribution of the assets of a delinquent taxpayer may 
similarly be held responsible for unpaid taxes.
268
 Claims of the U.S. government – 
including tax claims – are afforded statutory priority over other debts of an insolvent 
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 Bauer v United States, 543 F (2d) 142 (7th Cir 1976) at 150; Kalb v United States, 505 F (2d) 506 (2d 
Cir 174), cert denied, 421 US 979 (1975) [Kalb] at 511. 
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 Kalb, supra note 262 at 511; Monday v United States, 421 F (2d) 1210 (5th Cir 1970), cert denied, 400 
US 821 (1970) at 1215–17. 
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 IRC § 6901(a). 
265
 IRC § 6901(h). An even more comprehensive definition is provided in the regulations at 26 CFR § 
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 IRM, supra note 94, § 4.11.52.2; See also Wilkens & Matthews, supra note 245 at 292. 
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 IRC § 6901(a)(1); IRM, supra note 94, § 4.11.52.3.2. 
268
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estate or the estate of a deceased person.
269
 Where a “representative of a person or estate” 
pays any other debts of that person or estate before paying a claim of the U.S., the 
representative becomes liable. To help in dealing with the uncertainty created by this 
potential personal liability, an executor can apply for a release from personal liability, 
and, upon payment of the amounts owed by the estate, will receive it.
270
 
4.1.1.5 COLLECTION RESTRICTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 
 Generally, the IRS can only take collection action once a tax has been “assessed”. 
In the normal course of things, the process begins with a “notice of deficiency” which is 
mailed after the IRS determines that there is some tax liability that needs to be paid.
271
 
The “notice of deficiency” is sometimes called a “90-day letter”, as it provides the 
taxpayer with 90 days in which she may file a petition to contest the liability in the Tax 
Court.
272
 During these 90 days, the IRS is prevented from issuing an assessment, and 
therefore prevented from taking collection action.
273
 If a timely petition to the Tax Court 
is filed, the IRS is prevented from determining any further deficiency for the same tax 
year and the bar to assessment of any amount included in the notice of deficiency lasts 
until the Tax Court renders its final decision.
274
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 31 USC § 3713(a). This section does not apply in bankruptcy cases, which are discussed later in this 
chapter. 
270
 IRC § 6905(a); 26 CFR § 301.6905(a). The request must be made in writing, on the prescribed form, 
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 However, these restrictions on assessment and collection can lifted in appropriate 
cases.
275
 In what is a called a “termination assessment” the IRS is directed to immediately 
determine the amount of tax liability for the current year or preceding year of a taxpayer 
who the IRS discovers “designs quickly to depart from the United States or to remove his 
property therefrom, or to conceal himself or his property therein, or to do any other act 
(including in the case of a corporation distributing all or a part of its assets in liquidation 
or otherwise) tending to prejudice” the collection of income tax.
276
 Similarly, where the 
IRS believes that delay will jeopardize the assessment or collection of a deficiency, it is 
empowered to assess immediately and demand payment.
277
 Termination assessments and 





 The CRA’s collection powers operate somewhat differently, but they also appear 
to be aimed at collecting the tax debt quickly and at low cost. In this section, I briefly 
review the powers that the Income Tax Act gives to the CRA, including registering a 
certificate in the Federal Court, garnishment of amounts owed to the tax debtor, and 
seizure and sale of the tax debtor’s assets. In the next section, I suggest that these powers 
put the CRA in a comparable position to that of the IRS. While the details of the 
collection powers of the two tax authorities differ, both have a fairly robust set of 
statutory powers allowing them to collect tax debts quickly and efficiently. The 
similarities are such that a comparison of the collection powers given to the tax 
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276
 IRC § 6851. 
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278
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authorities in the two jurisdictions does not offer a compelling explanation for the marked 
difference in attitudes towards compromise in the two jurisdictions. 
4.1.2.1 CERTIFICATES AND MEMORIALS 
 Section 223 of the Income Tax Act provides a shortcut allowing the CRA access 
to all of the collection avenues normally available to judgment creditors. To accomplish 
this, the CRA first issues a certificate indicating the amount payable by the debtor.
279
 
This certificate can then be registered with the Federal Court and will have the same 
effect as a judgment of that court.
280
 No notice to the tax debtor is required when the 
CRA registers a certificate; however, the CRA generally does inform the tax debtor by 
mail.
281
 Among the remedies that the registration of the certificate opens up are the 
provincial systems for the registration of securities. The registered certificate (called a 
“memorial”) may be used to create a secured interest – “a charge, lien or priority on, or a 
binding interest in property” – in the same way that a judgment of a superior court of the 
province can.
282
 The Crown’s encumbrance of the tax debtor’s property is not given an 
unusually high priority – indeed, the Income Tax Act explicitly provides that the Crown’s 
charge will be subordinate to those that were registered earlier – however, the speed with 
which the CRA is able to obtain its judgment may provide the Crown with an advantage 
over other creditors. 
 As a judgment of the Federal Court, the memorial opens up other possibilities to 
allow the CRA to collect the debt. The Federal Court Rules provide procedures allowing 
                                                 
279
 ITA, supra note 3, s 223(2). 
280
 Ibid, s 223(3). The text of the provision affords the court no discretion in the registration process: “On 
production to the Federal Court, a certificate ... shall be registered”. 
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 Campbell, Administration 2012, supra note 9 at 341; Canada Revenue Agency, Information Circular 
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282
 ITA, supra note 3, s 223(5). 
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enforcement of a Federal Court order for the payment of money by, among others, a writ 
of seizure and sale and garnishment proceedings.
283
 However, similar avenues for 
enforcement are provided directly by the Income Tax Act, without the need to register a 
certificate or proceed using the Federal Court Rules. 
4.1.2.2 GARNISHMENT & SET-OFF 
 Section 224 of the Income Tax Act gives the CRA the power to demand payment 
of a tax debt from a third party that would otherwise be paying that money to the tax 
debtor. The CRA can make this demand to any person who is, or will be within one year, 
liable to make a payment to the tax debtor. Amounts that the CRA demands under a 
garnishment order – also called a “requirement to pay” – must be paid to the government 
as they become due to the tax debtor.
284
 In practical terms, this will give the CRA ready 
access to a taxpayer’s bank accounts and to her wages or accounts payable as they 
become due. Unlike garnishment remedies that are sometimes available to other 
creditors, there are few procedural preconditions to garnishment under the Income Tax 
Act.
285
 No judicial authorization is required (not even the minimal judicial authorization 
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 Federal Court Rules, supra note 60 at 425. 
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 For the sake of comparison, consider Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, s 60.08, under 
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 The CRA is also given the power, in some cases, to demand amounts that will be 
lent to the tax debtor in the next 90 days.
287
 While this seems to be a broad power that 
might allow the tax administration to force a tax debtor to borrow to pay her tax debts, 
the interpretation usually given to the provision is slightly narrower. The CRA is said to 
have agreed that it does not have the ability to draw on an unused line of credit, for 
example.
288
 However, it may intercept a loan that would otherwise be made to the debtor. 
So, while this power might not force the tax debtor to borrow to pay her tax debt, it could 
be used to prevent the tax debtor from borrowing for other purposes. 
 The CRA also has what is sometimes referred as an “enhanced requirement to 
pay” or “enhanced garnishment” power.
289
 One enhancement provided by subsection 
224(1.2) is the CRA’s ability to intercept payments to the tax debtor’s secured creditors 
whose right to receive those payments depends on the security.
290
 So, in cases where the 
tax debtor has assigned some source of income to another creditor, and even where that 
assignment is protected by a security interest, the CRA can override it. However, not all 
tax debts are collectable in this fashion. Broadly speaking, the intention of the enhanced 
garnishment is to cover amounts that ought to have been withheld and remitted by the 
debtor, the most significant of these being employees’ source deductions. 
                                                 
287
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The Income Tax Act clarifies that the garnishment provisions may apply to the 
federal and provincial governments.
291
 In other words, the CRA may intercept payments 
from the government, garnish the wages of government employees, and so on. In the case 
of federal government departments, however, a requirement to pay is unnecessary, as the 
Income Tax Act also provides for set-off.
292
 Using the statutory set off, any money owed 
to a tax debtor by a federal government department can be applied to the tax debt.
293
 
4.1.2.3 SEIZURE AND SALE OF CHATTELS 
 The final arrow in the CRA’s extrajudicial debt collection quiver is its power of 
seizure and sale. Subsection 225(1) allows the CRA to sei e “goods and chattels” after 
giving 30 days’ notice by registered mail.
294
 The tax debtor has a further 10 days to pay 
before the goods may be sold, the proceeds applied to her debt, and any surplus returned 
to her.
295
 In determining the goods that will be exempt from seizure, the Income Tax Act 
defers to the rules of the province in which the seizure is made.
296
    
4.1.2.4 THIRD PARTY LIABILITY 
 Like the United States, Canada’s tax system provides liability for certain third 
parties in certain circumstances. Directors of a corporation can be held liable for amounts 
that should have been withheld and remitted by the corporation, transferees may be held 
liable for debts of the transferor, and legal representatives such as trustees and executors 
may be held liable for taxes they ought to have paid in the course of their duties. Each of 
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these is considered here, with an attempt to highlight the differences between the 
Canadian and American treatment of this topic.  
4.1.2.4.1 Directors’ Liability 
 While the United States puts responsibility for the remission of source deductions 
on whoever is responsible in the context for performing that task, the Income Tax Act 
imposes third-party liability on directors of a corporation. Directors are jointly and 
severally liable for any failure to deduct or withhold and remit certain amounts that the 
corporation was required to withhold and remit, the most significant being employees’ 
source deductions.
297
 However, there are procedural hurdles for the CRA to clear and 
statutory defences available to directors. 
 First, the imposition of liability on a director requires, roughly speaking, that the 
tax could not be collected from the corporation. This requirement is fulfilled where the 
CRA has registered a certificate in Federal Court and execution of that judgment has been 
returned unsatisfied.
298
 Alternatively, if the corporation has commenced liquidation or 
dissolution proceedings, made an assignment in bankruptcy, or had a bankruptcy order 
made against it, directors can be liable where a claim for the corporation’s liability has 
been proven within six months of the commencement of those proceedings.
299
 
 Where that hurdle has been cleared and the corporation’s directors may be liable, 
there are additional barriers to collection. First, the CRA is obliged to begin proceedings 
                                                 
297
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no more than two years after a person ceased to be a director.
300
 Second, the director will 
not be liable if she “exercised the degree of care, diligence and skill to prevent the failure 
that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in comparable circumstances.”
301
 
The standard to be applied in judging due diligence is an objective standard, but one that 
takes into account the particular circumstances of the director.
302
 For example, the courts 
sometimes distinguish between “inside” directors who are involved in running the 
operation and “outside” directors who sit on the corporation’s board but are not involved 
on a day-to-day basis in its affairs.
303
 Inside directors will have considerable difficulty 
establishing due diligence where appropriate source deductions have not been made, 
while it may be reasonable for outside directors to rely on the assurances of others.
304
 
4.1.2.4.2 Transferees’ Liability 
 Only certain transferees can be held liable for the debts of the transferor. 
Subsection 160(1) of the Income Tax Act applies where a person has transferred property 
to any of the following: her spouse or common-law partner, or a person who has since 
become her spouse or common-law partner; a person under 18 years of age; or a person 
with whom the transferor was not dealing at arm’s length.
305
 In those cases, the transferee 
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is liable, jointly and severally with the transferor, to pay the transferor’s tax liability up to 
the difference in value between the transferred property and any consideration given.
306
 
The CRA can make an assessment under section 160 “at any time”, which has been held 
to mean that there is no limitation period.
307
 
 The transfer contemplated in section 160 includes more than gifts and sales for 
less than fair market value. The broad statutory language is as follows: “where a person 
has… transferred property, either directly or indirectly, by means of a trust or by any 
other means whatever”.
308
 It has been found to apply to the payment of a dividend, to the 
payment of family expenses and obligations, to the relinquishment of an interest in an 
estate, and to transfers made using corporations or trusts.
309
 
 Perhaps most notable in section 160 is the lack of restrictions on the CRA’s 
ability to impose joint and several liability. There is no time limit, and the CRA’s delay in 
making an assessment is not subject to judicial review.
310
 There is no requirement that the 
transfer in question was made with an eye towards avoiding the payment of the tax 
debt.
311
 Due diligence is not a defence under section 160.
312
 The CRA is free to assess the 
transferee even if the transferor’s debt was discharged in bankruptcy after the transfer 
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 There is also no requirement that the CRA make any attempt to collect the 
debt from the primary tax debtor before assessing the transferee.
314
 Because of these 
features, the Federal Court of Appeal has called section 160 “draconian” and noted that, 
in its use “there is always some potential for an unjust result.”
315
 Nevertheless, it is a 
valid and remarkable tool at the CRA’s disposal.  
4.1.2.4.3 Trustees, Executors, etc. 
 Canada holds trustees and executors personally liable for unpaid taxes. Subsection 
159(1) makes a “legal representative” of a taxpayer jointly and severally liable with the 
taxpayer.
316
 Legal representatives include trustees, executors, trustees in bankruptcy, or 
anyone who is “administering, winding up, controlling or otherwise dealing in a 
representative or fiduciary capacity” with the taxpayer’s property or that of the taxpayer’s 
estate.
317
 The representative’s liability is limited to the taxpayer’s property in her 
possession or control, or, if the representative has distributed property, to the value of the 
property distributed.
318
 To avoid personal liability, the legal representative is directed to 
apply for and obtain a clearance certificate before distributing the property.
319
 The 
certificate states that all amounts which the taxpayer is or can reasonably expected to 
become liable have been paid, and that all amounts which the legal representative is or 
can reasonably expected to become liable have been paid.
320
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4.1.2.5 COLLECTION RESTRICTIONS, EXCEPTIONS, AND JEOPARDY 
 The Income Tax Act defines a “tax debt” as “any amount payable by a taxpayer 
under this Act.”
321
 This includes income tax, penalties, interest, withholding taxes, and 
source deductions. These are “debt[s] due to her Majesty and [are] recoverable as such in 
the Federal Court or any other court of competent jurisdiction or in any other manner 
provided by” the Income Tax Act.
322
 That is to say that debt arises by operation of the 
Income Tax Act – it exists regardless of whether the Minister has assessed it.  
However, in the normal course of events, the CRA must first assess tax and mail a 
notice of assessment before any step toward collection can be taken.
323
 In most cases, the 
CRA is forced to wait 90 days from the date of the assessment.
324
 If the taxpayer objects 
to the assessment, the CRA continues to be prevented from taking action to collect the 
amount in dispute until the dispute is resolved, either through the administrative appeals 
process or on appeal to the Tax Court of Canada.
325
 During this period, the CRA is 
prohibited from commencing proceedings in court, certifying the debt, making a 
garnishment order, or sei ing the tax debtor’s property.
326
  
 There are exceptions to those collection restrictions. Two blanket exceptions are 
notable. First, assessments of amounts required to be deducted or withheld, such as 
payroll deductions, are not subject to the collection restrictions. Second, the CRA may 
take action to collect one half of the outstanding balance on an assessment of a large 
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corporation within the 90-day period after the assessment in spite of the collection 
restriction, and, in some cases, more of the debt can be collected after the 90-day period 
but while the assessment is still in dispute.
327
 
In addition to these blanket exceptions, the CRA can ask for the collection 
restrictions to be lifted in cases where the delay would jeopardize collection of the debt. 
Subsection 225.2(2) allows the CRA to make an ex parte application to a judge, and if the 
judge “is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the collection of all or 
any part of an amount assessed in respect of a taxpayer would be jeopardized by a delay 
in the collection of that amount, the judge shall” authori e the CRA to use its full panoply 
of collection powers.
328
 This “jeopardy order” may be made even where a notice of 
assessment has not been sent if the judge agrees that receipt of the notice “would likely 
further jeopardize the collection of the amount”.
329
 
 While the application is made and the order issued ex parte, the taxpayer does 
have the opportunity to contest it after the fact. The taxpayer has the right to a hearing to 
review the jeopardy order. The judge is directed to “determine the question summarily” 
and “may confirm, set aside or vary the authorization and make such other order as the 
judge considers appropriate.”
330
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 Since the enactment of amendments to Income Tax Act in 2004, there is also an 
upper limit on the amount of time that the CRA has to collect a tax debt. Starting usually 
with the end of the 90-day period discussed above, the CRA has ten years to collect.
332
 
However, this 10 year limitation period restarts if the taxpayer acknowledges the debt (in 
writing or by making a payment on account of the debt), the CRA commences collection 
action, or the CRA takes certain other actions, such as assessing a legal representative or 
a transferee in respect of the debt.
333
 The time limit is also extended in certain cases, such 
as those in which the CRA accepts security in lieu of payment of a tax debt or the CRA is 
prevented from taking collection action because of bankruptcy proceedings.
334
 
4.1.3 COMPARING COLLECTION POWERS 
 Simply looking at the statutory collection powers given to the CRA and the IRS, 
it is difficult to find any evidence for the hypothesis that the CRA’s comparative 
reluctance to compromise is motivated by a comparative strength in its ability to collect. 
Both the IRS and CRA have extrajudicial processes allowing them to seize assets from 
the tax debtor directly and from third parties. Both impose liability on third parties in 
roughly similar circumstances. Both have mechanisms allowing the tax authorities to take 
swift action when the collection of the debt becomes jeopardized. 
 In considering collection restrictions, the IRS is prevented from assessing (and 
therefore collecting) where the taxpayer contests a notice of deficiency, while the CRA is 
only prevented from collecting the amount actually in dispute. On the other hand, the IRS 
itself has the power to determine when a jeopardy assessment or a termination assessment 
should be made, while the CRA needs to go to court to obtain a jeopardy order. However, 
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the hearing for a jeopardy order is ex parte, and the judge generally will rely on affidavit 
evidence from the CRA and on the CRA’s good faith.
335
 Accordingly, CRA will be able 
to quickly obtain jeopardy orders with little difficulty in appropriate cases.  
 Comparing the abilities of the tax authorities to secure their interests yields a 
similar result. The federal tax lien is created automatically and made effective upon the 
filing of notice. In comparison, for the CRA to secure its interest requires going to court 
to register a certificate, and then making use of the avenues generally available to 
judgment creditors. Again, the CRA appears to have an extra step, and requires the 
involvement of a judge, but, given the direction that the Income Tax Act gives judges in 
these cases, the burden of this step is relatively minor. 
Third party liability provisions in the United States apply to a larger class of 
people, offering the IRS more potential avenues for collection. Again, however, the 
difference should not be overstated. The Canadian provisions offer the CRA certain 
strengths as well, such as the absence of any time limit to make an assessment against a 
non-arm’s length transferee, and the wide variety of transactions that may qualify as a 
transfer for the purposes of transferee liability. 
 The statutory collection mechanisms in both the U.S. and Canada are designed to 
allow the revenue authorities to collect as quickly and as efficiently as possible. 
However, many of the cases in which compromise, settlement, and forgiveness will come 
into play will be those where the collection powers are of little use because the taxpayer 
simply does not have the resources available to satisfy her debts. While the speed of the 
statutory collection powers may give the IRS and the CRA an advantage over other 
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creditors before the formalized processes of insolvency are triggered, their positions in 
bankruptcy remain to be considered. 
4.2 THE TAX AUTHORITY AS A CREDITOR IN BANKRUPTCY 
4.2.1 UNITED STATES: A POSITION OF STRENGTH FOR THE IRS 
 In this section, I present a summary of the interaction between the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code and the collection of tax debts.
336
 As discussed above, tax claims in the 
United States are not treated as ordinary unsecured claims (they are, at the very 
minimum, secured by the lien). While there are a number of nuances that might be 
considered in a more complete treatment of American bankruptcy tax law, for the 
purpose of comparing the IRS’s position in bankruptcy proceedings with the CRA’s 
position in Canadian bankruptcy proceedings, I focus on two main issues: the priority 
given to tax claims and the dischargeability of tax debts.
337
 Priority in discussions of 
bankruptcy and insolvency laws refers to the degree to which a claim (in this case, the 
government’s tax claim) can be preferred to the claims of competing creditors. 
Dischargeability refers to whether the claim is dealt with in the course of the bankruptcy 
proceedings. If the tax debt is discharged, then the debtor has no further legal obligation 
to pay it, whether or not it was paid in full during the course of the bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
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 Before setting out the American treatment of these issues, it is worth briefly 
explaining that bankruptcy cases in the United States are generally referred to by the 
chapter of the Bankruptcy Code under which they are commenced. Chapter 7 deals with 
liquidation of the assets of either individuals or corporate entities. Chapters 9, 11, 12, and 
13 all provide for reorganization, adjustment, or consolidation of debts for different 
groups. Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceedings are open exclusively to municipalities. 
Chapter 12 allows for the adjustment of debts for family farmers and fishermen. Chapter 
11 is generally used for the reorganization of corporate structures, and chapter 13 deals 
with the adjustment of the debts of individuals (though individuals can make use of 
chapter 11 in some cases). The discussion below refers mostly to chapter 7 or “straight” 
bankruptcy, but also makes reference to reorganizations or adjustments under chapter 11 
and chapter 13. 
4.2.1.1 PRIORITY FOR TAX CLAIMS 
 The U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides a list of claims that will be preferred to other 
unsecured claims.
338
 Eighth on the list are certain “unsecured claims of governmental 
units” including income taxes for which returns were due in the three years before the 
filing of the petition in bankruptcy, those that were assessed in the 240 days before the 
filing date of the petition, and those that were not assessed before the bankruptcy but are 
assessable after the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings.
339
 
 This places the government’s income tax claim behind unsecured claims for 
domestic support obligations, certain administrative expenses incurred by the estate, 
                                                 
338
 11 USC § 507(a). 
339
 11 USC § 501(a)(8). A discussion of the difficult nuances is available: Dunham & Shimkus, supra note 
337. For example, determining when a return was due may be complex, particularly where extensions were 
granted. 
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certain claims for wages, salary, or commissions, and several other categories of 
unsecured claim, but ahead of all other unsecured creditors. Moreover, the Bankruptcy 
Code also subordinates tax claims secured by a tax lien to the same seven categories of 
debts, essentially by allowing those claims to make use of the government’s lien.
340
 
4.2.1.2 DISCHARGE OF TAX DEBTS 
 Debts are not always discharged in the course of bankruptcy proceedings.
341
 In 
chapter 7 cases, only individuals can have their debts discharged – corporate debtors can 
not.
342
 Similarly, a reorganization of a corporation or partnership under chapter 11 will 
not result in a discharge where the plan that is confirmed provides for the liquidation of 
all or substantially all of the bankruptcy estate’s property.
343
 In addition to these blanket 
restrictions, discharge of debts in chapter 7 cases can be denied for a variety of reasons 
that generally centre on financial dishonesty.
344
 
 Even where discharge of debts is granted, however, tax debts are often excluded. 
The same categories of tax debts that are given priority are not dischargeable.
345
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Generally speaking, then, discharge can be granted for tax debts that are more than three 
years old, unless they were assessed less than 240 days before the bankruptcy. However, 
further exceptions apply. If the relevant tax return was not filed or was filed late and 
within two years of the start of the bankruptcy proceedings, discharge will not be 
granted.
346
 If the relevant return was fraudulent or if the debtor made a willful attempt to 
evade the tax in question, then a discharge will not be granted.
347
 
 The general sense of the provisions related to the discharge of tax debts is that 
“[t]he policy of giving an honest debtor a fresh start in life [via the bankruptcy discharge] 
is subordinated to the goal of protecting the public fisc”.
348
 In reflecting on the effect of 
priorities for tax claims and non-dischargeability of tax debts, one commentator calls 
them “complementary”.
349
 That is, the priority is granted in the hope that the debts will 
be paid, and so the non-dischargeability of the tax debts will not prevent the debtor from 
receiving a fresh start.
350
 Another reading would say that the two goals of the liquidation 
bankruptcy – “relief of debtors and equitable treatment of creditors” – are subordinated 
to, and perhaps undermined by, the goal of collecting as much tax as possible.
351
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4.2.2 CANADA: CRA AS AN ORDINARY, UNSECURED CREDITOR IN BANKRUPTCY 
 Canada’s bankruptcy system also provides for both liquidation and reorgani ation 
procedures. In this section, I discuss the position that the Canada Revenue Agency has in 
these proceedings. Generally speaking, tax debts in Canada rank as ordinary, unsecured 
claims, and the CRA is treated as any other creditor. However, the exception to this 
general rule, which significantly improves the CRA’s ability to collect, is the special 
place afforded to amounts that are required to be withheld and remitted. 
4.2.2.1 REORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE CCAA AND THE BIA 
 The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) is the vehicle for most large 
corporate restructurings in Canada and is sometimes said to be the equivalent of chapter 
11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
352
 Restructuring under the CCAA is only available to 
corporations or corporate groups that have more than $5 million worth of claims against 
them.
353
 For debtors that do not meet this requirement, the possibility of reorganization 
under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act also exists.
354
 In either case, the process is 
intended to result in a proposal that the creditors together (including the CRA) will vote 
to accept or reject. If the proposal is accepted, the obligations set out in the proposal 
replace those that existed previously. If the plan is rejected either by the creditors or by 
the court, the proceedings may continue and the various stakeholders may attempt to 
negotiate another plan. However, creditors may be inclined to ask the court to enforce 
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their claims (indeed, the CRA’s extrajudicial collection powers mean that the CRA may 
not need to involve the court if no stay of collection is in force).
355
 The debtor may also 
choose to commence, or the creditors may attempt to force, bankruptcy proceedings that 
will focus on liquidation and distribution of the debtors assets. 
Restructuring schemes under both the CCAA and the BIA explicitly provide 
protection for the same debts that the CRA has the power to collect using the enhanced 
requirement to pay provided by subsection 224(1.2), the most significant being employee 
source deductions.
356
 Unless the CRA waives the requirement, the court can not sanction 
a proposal that does not include full payment of these debts within six months. However, 
aside from this special protection for these debts, the CRA acts as any other creditor in 
the process would. It evaluates the proposal, votes accordingly, and is bound by the 
results of the vote. 
4.2.2.2 BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 
Again, there are two distinct issues to explore in relation to the CRA’s position in 
bankruptcy proceedings: the priority given to tax debts and the circumstances in which 
tax debts are discharged by bankruptcy. 
4.2.2.2.1 Tax Claims as Ordinary Unsecured Claims 
 Historically, the Crown enjoyed a privileged place in bankruptcy proceedings. 
However, in a large round of amendments to the bankruptcy system in 1992, most of the 
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Crown priorities were removed.
357
  Currently, the general rule is that the Crown’s claims 
– including CRA’s tax claims – rank as ordinary unsecured claims. However, several 
exceptions exist that give the CRA a slightly stronger hand to play. Security interests that 
have been registered in a public registry system are still treated as secured claims.
358
 So 
where the CRA has taken the steps of certifying the debt, obtaining a memorial in Federal 
Court and registering that memorial in a public registry system before the bankruptcy 
occurs, the Crown’s interest will be protected.
359
 
 In addition to secured claims registered in a public registry, the CRA has the 
advantage of a statutory deemed trust for amounts that the debtor was required to deduct 
or withhold and remit to the Crown.
360
 Again, the most significant of these debts are the 
source deductions that employers are required to remit on behalf of their employees. 
These particular statutory trusts, together with similar provisions of the Canada Pension 
Plan, Employment Insurance Act, and provisions of provincial statutes that have similar 
purposes, survive the broader rule that statutory trusts in favour of the Crown are not 
effective in bankruptcy proceedings.
361
 
Working in parallel with the deemed trust provisions is the enhanced requirement 
to pay. A stay of collection proceedings pursuant to subsection 69(1) or 69.1(1) of the 
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BIA prevents the CRA from issuing a new enhanced requirement to pay.
362
 However, 
where no stay is in place, nothing prevents the CRA from exercising the enhanced 
garnishment power.
363
 Moreover, where an enhanced requirement to pay is already in 
place, the amounts that are covered by the enhanced requirement to pay (including those 
which are to be paid as they become due) are considered property of the Crown, and 
therefore do not become part of the bankruptcy estate.
364
 
Before leaving the discussion of the Crown’s preferences and priorities in 
bankruptcy, it is worth noting that speedy pre-bankruptcy use of the statutory collection 
powers by the CRA is not seen as an illegitimate evasion of the scheme of the BIA. In I. 
Waxman & Sons, the CRA sought and received a jeopardy order based explicitly on the 
debtor’s impending receivership.
365
 The receivership order, once granted, would stay 
collection proceedings and the Crown would be treated as an unsecured creditor.
366
 Using 
the jeopardy order, the CRA exercised its garnishment power before the receiver was 
appointed. The debtor was later declared bankrupt, and litigation ensued between the 
trustee in bankruptcy and the Crown. The trustee argued, among other things, that the 
CRA’s actions had given the Crown an improper priority contrary to the scheme of the 
BIA.
367
 Both the Ontario Superior Court and the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected this 
line of argument and held that there is nothing improper in CRA exercising its statutory 
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rights and collecting the debt in advance of receivership or bankruptcy proceedings. Both 
levels of court agreed that “[other] [u]nsecured creditors who had similarly executed on 
their judgments would be treated similarly. No unfair advantage has been conferred on 
the CRA.”
368
 So, while tax claims may prove difficult to collect in bankruptcy 
proceedings because of the low rank given to the Crown’s claims, the CRA is free to use 
its statutory collection powers to win the pre-bankruptcy “race of diligence”.
369
 
4.2.2.2.2 Tax Claims Dischargeable, but “Tax Debtors” not Automatically 
Discharged 
 Like the American Bankruptcy Code, the BIA provides a list of debts that are not 
discharged in bankruptcy. Like the American list, it includes student loan obligations, 
domestic support obligations, and debts that result from certain intentional torts. Unlike 
the American list, the Canadian exceptions to bankruptcy discharge do not include tax 
claims.
370
 However, since the coming into force of recent amendments to the BIA in 
2009, bankrupts with large tax debts no longer receive an automatic discharge in 
bankruptcy.
371
 While tax debts may be discharged, debtors who meet the following 
criteria are forced to apply for a discharge after waiting a minimum period: (1) the debtor 
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owes a tax debt of more than $200,000; and (2) the tax debt represents 75% or more of 
the total unsecured claims.
372
 
 In these circumstances, the tax debtor must apply for the discharge and the court 
has the power to do any of the following: grant the discharge and impose conditions such 
as performing some acts or paying some amount; suspend the discharge; or, refuse the 
discharge.
373
 In making its decision, the court is directed to consider the following list of 
factors: 
(a) the circumstances of the bankrupt at the time the 
personal income tax debt was incurred; 
(b) the efforts, if any, made by the bankrupt to pay the 
personal income tax debt; 
(c) whether the bankrupt made payments in respect of other 
debts while failing to make reasonable efforts to pay the 
personal income tax debt; and 




The effect, then, is to put the burden on the tax debtor to justify the discharge of the tax 
debt, including with reference to her tax compliance prior to the bankruptcy. However, as 
others have noted, these provisions are like to apply only in rare cases where those with 
unusually high tax debts seek to misuse the bankruptcy process by paying other creditors 
instead of the government.
375
 
4.3 DIFFERENT SITES OF FORGIVENESS 
 The CRA’s collection powers afford them the potential of collecting debts quickly 
and efficiently, but the comparison here shows that this strong position does not provide a 
compelling explanation for the comparative reluctance of Canadian policy makers to 
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design compromise mechanisms into the tax system. The IRS has similar collection 
powers with similar goals, but American policy makers and academics still see 
compromise as a useful part of the tax system. Moreover, the American tax authorities 
have an arguably stronger position when the two bankruptcy systems are included in the 
comparison.  
 It is worth repeating that the discussion above is necessarily incomplete. To paint 
a complete picture of the abilities of two tax authorities to collect debts would require 
looking at a wide variety of factors that I have not considered here. For example, the tax 
authority’s ability to collect would be influenced by the following: the remedies generally 
available to creditors at the sub-national level in each country; insolvency provisions, 
such as receivership, that are available at the sub-national level; differences in the typical 
behaviour of other creditors in the “race of diligence” situation; differences in levels of 
secured financing; and differences in the political constraints on aggressive tax collection 
strategies.  
However, this consideration of the federal tax systems and bankruptcy systems of 
the two countries does offer a useful conclusion. Broadly speaking, the Canadian tax 
system refuses to compromise or forgive tax debts. Instead, it relies on insolvency and 
bankruptcy regimes to make decisions about when non-collection of a tax debt is 
appropriate. By holding the CRA to its duty to collect the full debt, but treating it as an 
ordinary unsecured creditor in bankruptcy, the Canadian tax system effectively 
outsources decisions about forgiveness to the bankruptcy system. 
On the other hand, policy makers in the United States have opted to include the 
compromise mechanisms in the tax system. They give the tax authority responsibility for 
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making decisions about the forgiveness of tax debts. Moreover, American policy makers 
have, to some extent, removed from tax debts from purview of the bankruptcy system by 
giving them priority and by protecting them from discharge in bankruptcy. 
 The consideration of collection powers and bankruptcy systems in this chapter 
shows that the main difference we see is not that one country’s tax authority has a 
stronger incentive towards compromise or forgiveness. Rather, each jurisdiction 
confronts the reality that taxpayers are sometimes unable to pay the amounts that the tax 
system demands of them. Canada locates the process of making decisions about taxpayer 
that can not pay outside the tax system in bankruptcy and insolvency regimes. The United 
States includes compromise in the tax system and removes it from the bankruptcy system. 
 It is worth repeating that the contrast is not quite so stark. Some tax debts are 
discharged in Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases, and the strong powers that the CRA has to 
collect source deductions in bankruptcy are significant. Nevertheless, the broadly 
applicable rules are revealing. There are sure to be a number of consequences that flow 
from the decision to use one mechanism or the other to forgive tax liability. These 
consequences reverberate through debtor-creditor law, bankruptcy and insolvency law, 
and tax law, among others. In chapter 5, I use the lens of tax policy to consider the 
implications of Canada’s posture towards forgiveness as revealed in this chapter and in 
chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 5:  TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
5.1 THE TRADITIONAL TAX POLICY FRAMEWORK 
The discussion thus far has looked at mechanisms in the Canadian and American 
tax systems that allow or forbid the settlement, compromise, or forgiveness of tax 
assessed. Chapter 3 looked in some detail at the administration of these programs. 
Drawing on the insights of Lon Fuller’s work, I argued that the Canadian system forces 
the taxpayer and the tax administration into an adversarial setting at every turn, while the 
American system allows bargaining. In chapter 4, I added some context to the discussion 
by examining the powers of and the constraints on the tax administration as a creditor. 
Comparing the two jurisdictions, I suggested that American policy makers have chosen to 
use the tax system to make decisions about the forgiveness of tax debts, while the 
Canadian approach is to make those decisions elsewhere. 
In this chapter, I return to some of the questions raised in the second chapter and 
look more closely at whether there might be a case for some compromise mechanism 
within the Canadian tax system. In chapter 2, I suggested three possible grounds for a 
forgiveness mechanism in the tax system: for administrative efficiency; as a 
counterweight to existing inequities; and, as a part of a larger social safety net. Here, I 
return to these questions, looking at the issue of compromise from the point of view of 
tax policy. I suggest that there is a reasonably strong tax policy case for allowing 
compromise in the context of tax collection in Canada. In considering the dispute 
resolution context, while I have suggested that there may be overlooked problems in the 
status quo, I conclude that I am unable to offer any satisfying alternative.  
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Generally speaking, taxation systems are analyzed using three criteria: equity, 
efficiency, and administrability. Equity is sometimes discussed as having horizontal and 
vertical components. Horizontal equity is shorthand for the idea that people in similar 
situations should be taxed similarly.
376
 In our tax system (taxing individuals on the basis 
of their income), the implication is that individuals with the same income should bear the 
same tax. Vertical equity discusses the relationship between taxpayers who are differently 
situated. A better off taxpayer should pay more tax than one who is worse off. In 
Canada’s system, an individual with a higher income should pay more tax than an 
individual with a lower income. 
Horizontal and vertical equity are not always considered independent concepts.
377
 
Questions around the equal treatment of equals lead to questions about the appropriate 
different treatment of unequals, and vice versa. Nevertheless, the rubrics of horizontal 
and vertical equity can be analytically useful. Discussing vertical equity often leads to a 
debate about the degree of progressivity that is desirable in the tax system. On the idea of 
horizontal equity – treating like taxpayers alike – there can be less disagreement. Instead, 
the disagreement arises when we need to measure, in practical terms, the well-being of 
taxpayers in order to assess the same tax liability.
378
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Efficiency, in tax policy analysis, is generally taken to represent the idea that the 
tax system should avoid interfering with the proper functioning of the free market. That 
is, it should avoid influencing the decision making of taxpayers and distorting the 
efficient allocation of resources by the market. Efficiency in this context is sometimes 




Administrability, sometimes called simplicity or administrative practicality, also 
refers to efficiency in a more everyday sense of the word.
380
 The tax system should be as 
easy or as efficient as possible to administer. Generally, it is thought that this requires the 
system to be as simple as possible to keep both taxpayers’ compliance costs and the cost 
of administering the system low. The tax system should be “efficient” in the sense of 
reducing the time, money, and effort it requires of the taxpayers and of the agencies that 
will enforce it (administrable), in addition to being “efficient” in the sense that it should 
avoid distorting the allocation of resources by the market(neutral). 
While these are the three traditional goals of a tax system, not all provisions in a 
contemporary taxing statute are related to these goals. Both the Income Tax Act and the 
Internal Revenue Code contain what are known as “tax expenditures”.
381
 These are 
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provisions that are formally part of the tax system but functionally equivalent to 
government spending. Through the tax system, Canada’s federal government subsidi es 
students, transit users, home owners, volunteer firefighters, and many other individuals 
and activities.
382
 The government could have chosen to support these activities in a 
number of different ways. For example, the government could create new public 
institutions, increase the funding to existing institutions, or, mail cheques to individuals. 
The government choses to provide tax credits or exemptions instead for a variety of 
reasons: to make use of an existing bureaucracy rather than creating a new one; to save 
expense of mailing cheques, or fulfill a political desire to make the spending more or less 
visible than it would otherwise be. Although these measures are included in the taxing 
statute and administered by the tax authority, it is analytical useful to think of them as 
government spending measures rather than tax measures. 
While I will make use of the traditional analytical framework in this chapter, I note 
that its soundness is contested. As I described above, it typically involves divorcing the 
analysis of the taxation system from the analysis of government spending. While this 
keeps the scope of the analytical task manageable, it may be problematic to consider the 
equity of the taxation system while remaining entirely indifferent to how the government 
spends the money. Under this framework, a flat tax system in a jurisdiction that spends 
all of its tax money on foreign wars can be considered exactly as equitable as a flat tax 
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Criticisms have also been levied at equity and efficiency.
384
 Where they are 
accepted, they are often presented as contrasting goals, and so commentators differ 
regarding the weight each should be given.
385
 Sometimes forgotten in our eagerness to 
trade equity for efficiency or vice versa are issues around administrability, which is not 
just an ideal the tax system must endeavor to meet, but a firm requirement. Whatever else 
it does, the tax system will be administered, and so tax academics will sometimes talk 




 In the discussion below, I engage with the traditional analytical criteria in spite of 
the force of these criticisms. Any persuasive case for the incorporation of a forgiveness 
mechanism into the current Canadian tax system must engage with that system as it is 
and as it is currently understood and discussed. While we should keep in mind what may 
be missing or misleading about the traditional analysis, here it will be useful in discussing 
the effects that forgiveness or compromise might have on Canadian tax law and policy or 
in attempting to explain why Canada’s tax system eschews such compromise. 
5.2 COMPROMISE AS ADMINISTRABILITY 
As I said in the second chapter, it seems fairly clear that a case can be made for 
compromise if we are concerned only with the net cost of tax collection, which I will take 
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to be a part of the discussion of administrability.
387
 This argument has some overlap with 
the argument for economic efficiency – all else being equal, administration of the system 
at a lower cost would be “efficient” in both senses. However, I treat the two separately in 
order to have a clearer discussion below about the incentives that might be created by 
rules allowing for compromise. In this section, I suggest that in the context of debt 
collection and in the context of dispute resolution, there are cases in which compromise 
would allow the tax authorities to collect more money, to collect sooner, and to collect 
with less expense. 
The reason that this is the most obvious ground for an argument in favour of 
compromise is that we would normally expect that, if allowed to compromise, the tax 
collectors would act as any other rational creditor and attempt to maximize the amount of 
money that they collect. In the collections context, the government could rationally weigh 
a tax debtor’s offer, considering the amount of the offer, the amount it expects to be able 
to collect though the usual channels, the cost of collection action, the risks and costs of 
bankruptcy proceedings, and so on. With a reasonable appreciation of the various factors, 
we could then expect that the tax collector would, sometimes, conclude that the 
compromise would be the most cost effective solution. 
 A similar dynamic might exist in the dispute resolution context. We would 
generally expect litigants – including the Crown in other contexts – to consider offers to 
settle the litigation with a number of factors in mind, including the time and expense of 
litigation and the likelihoods of various possible outcomes. Again, these calculations are 
                                                 
387
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sure to reveal some instances in which settlement will be a more cost effective way of 
resolving the dispute than litigation would be.  
Several objections are obvious. First, while it may be useful to examine in isolation 
ways in which more tax could be collected earlier and more cheaply, this is obviously not 
the only goal of the tax administration. Enforcing the taxing statute requires both a 
concern for fairness among taxpayers and a concern for the incentives that might be 
created by the way that the system is administered. These become even more important 
because a lack of equity may undermine taxpayers’ faith in the tax system and 
compliance with it and the government’s financial gains could be lost. Similarly, if the 
way the system is administered creates perverse incentives or avoidance opportunities, 
the gains will be lost. Further, it is not entirely clear that Canada’s system is not currently 
providing adequate opportunities for forgiveness to meet these goals. In the collections 
context, bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, taxpayer relief provisions, and 
remission orders all provide some measure of forgiveness. In the dispute resolution 
context, cases do settle frequently, and, as I argued in chapter 2, it is likely that some of 
these are compromise agreements in substance, even if they meet the formal requirements 
of the principled basis doctrine. In fleshing out the argument below, I consider the 
implications of compromise in terms of both equity and neutrality and I suggest that a 




5.3 FORGIVENESS AS EQUITY 
Accepting that we may gain from compromise in terms of the revenue collected for 
the cost, we might still be unwilling to accept the idea of making compromises – of 
forgiving the debts of specific taxpayers – on equitable grounds. After all, equity would 
seem to demand the application of the same set of rules to all taxpayers.  That is, while 
we may save significant legal costs when we settle litigation or administrative costs when 
we compromise a debt rather than pursue collection, that compromise will have a cost in 
terms of equity. Compromise in a specific taxpayer’s case will move the system away 
from treating like taxpayers alike. This is not necessarily fatal to the argument for 
compromise: we might, for example, satisfy ourselves that the cost to equity is small 
enough and the administrability gain is large enough to justify the trade-off. However, for 
those who, like the Carter Commission, view equity as the overriding goal of the tax 
system, such an argument will be unconvincing.
388
 
In this section, my goal is to question the premise that a mechanism for the 
forgiveness of tax debts necessarily reduces the equity in the tax system. Looking 
particularly at Canada, I start by pointing out that the Income Tax Act should not be 
thought of as the paragon of equity. Moreover, because of the diversity of human 
arrangements, we should not ever expect a set of rules to be universally applicable with 
perfect equity. It follows that some divergences from the generally applicable rules might 
increase, rather than decrease, the equity of the system. 
Shu-Yi Oei made a similar case in her efforts to justify and suggest reforms to the 
American offer-in-compromise program. In her analysis, she notes three types of 
“indeterminacy” in the American tax system that lead away from the notion that the 
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amount of tax assessed should be “viewed as a neutral and equitable baseline without 
further investigation.”
389
 In discussing “baseline indeterminacy” she draws on the work 
of Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel as well as critical tax scholars to question the idea 
that pre-tax market income can work as baseline for fair taxation.
390
 Oei captures this 
point best when she says, “if… Person A – due to underlying social structures and known 
disparities – has put in the same amount of inputs (e.g., effort, education, and time) but 
earns less pre-tax income than Person V, then is it fair to tax them equally?”
391
 “Policy 
indeterminacy” refers to the idea that choices are made in drafting the taxing statute 
(income inclusions, deductions, and so on) where, in some cases, there are several viable 
options.
392
 She argues that any theoretically ideal tax base is compromised in practice, 
and so it is not “obvious that we should default to considering the sum total of all of these 
policy choices (that is, the assessed tax liability amount) as a per se equitable 
outcome.”
393
 Finally, “executional indeterminacy” in Oei’s taxonomy refers to the idea 
that “idiosyncrasies and intricacies” of the tax system in operation may give rise to 
inequitable outcomes in practice.
394
 If the amount of tax assessed pursuant to the taxing 
statute is not necessarily the most equitable result, then an effective and well-designed 




In making my argument here, I present similar ideas. While I present the ideas 
slightly differently, give more space to certain facets of the argument, and attempt to pay 
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particular attention to how the argument might be applied to the Canadian income tax 
system, this section might be thought of as an endorsement of Oei’s justification of the 
offer-in-compromise program. 
Following that, I step back from the discussion of whether equity is either present 
or possible in the tax system and engage the assumption that the best proxy for equity 
would be perfect compliance with the taxing statutes and full payment of tax debts. Even 
assuming that the system is equitable, it must be conceded that compliance and collection 
are not perfect. The question then becomes whether the tax authority can, in effect, 
bargain to increase equity. 
These two lines of argument apply to justify forgiveness with some force in the 
collections context, but, as I explain, fit somewhat awkwardly in the dispute resolution 
context. Still, I look at what lessons might be drawn from this discussion to apply in the 
resolution of tax disputes and consider whether compromise settlements of tax disputes 
might ever be thought of as equitable. 
5.3.1 MEASURING ABILITY TO PAY 
It is generally accepted that fairness in the tax system requires taxation in 
proportion to the taxpayer’s ability to pay.
396
 It is worth noting at the outset that both the 
slogan “ability to pay” as a rallying cry for those who favour a progressive income tax 
and the principle of taxation based on ability to pay have been the subject of significant 
criticism.
397
 Henry Simons, whose name is often attached to the idea of the 
comprehensive tax base, on which he believed we could construct an equitable income 
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tax, disparaged “ability to pay” as the conceptual underpinning.
398
 Others see taxation 
based on the level of benefits received from the government as more efficient and more 
equitable, though impractical in a modern welfare state like Canada.
399
 Many criticisms 
of the conceptual coherence of taxation based on ability to pay have been levied, leading 
some proponents of progressive income taxation to attempt other groundings for the same 
system, and others to refine and defend ability to pay.
400
 
Here, I do not propose to engage in the debate around the concept of taxation 
based on ability to pay. I simply note that the idea has been broadly accepted and relay 
what I consider to be a fairly standard account of the way in which it is translated into an 
operational tax system. For the purposes of this section, the key point is that, in 
translating the concept of taxation based on ability to pay to a working tax system, there 
are numerous ways in which the practical necessarily departs from the ideal. These 
departures will exist even under the contestable assumption that we have an agreed upon 
and clear notion of what we mean by “ability to pay”. Moreover, these departures are not 
mistakes that can be corrected. Our tax system is doomed to imperfection – it is the 
necessary by-product of moving from the conceptual into the operational. 
One final note before the discussion of how the idea of ability to pay grounds 
Canada’s income tax system: I do not believe that the claim here ought to be particularly 
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controversial. After all, remission orders under the Financial Administration Act and the 
taxpayer relief provisions in the Income Tax Act are based on the premise that the tax 




5.3.1.1 OPERATIONALIZING ABILITY TO PAY 
The Carter Report can be seen as an attempt to flesh out a tax system in which 
equity is the overriding goal and that goal is thought to require taxation in proportion to 
ability to pay.
402
 The Royal Commission, like many others, saw an income tax using the 
Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income as the best measure of an individual’s ability 
to pay taxes.
403
  enry Simons put the definition as follows: “the algebraic sum of (1) the 
market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the 
store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question.”
404
 
Ability to pay also mandates at least some progressivity: the level of income necessary 
for basic maintenance or subsistence should be considered unavailable to tax, as it does 
not contribute to the taxpayer’s ability to pay.
405
 There are, therefore, at least two tax 
brackets and a progressive structure.
406
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However, as a reader of the Carter Report will quickly realize, fleshing out the 
system within those parameters requires that difficult decisions be made. At times, it 
requires that the ideally equitable tax – the tax which would better reflect the taxpayer’s 
ability to pay – be sacrificed in favour of the practical administration of the system or out 
of a concern for the incentives that the tax system might create. In many circumstances, 
there will simply be no practicable set of rules that is capable of adequately and fairly 
capturing the ability to pay of all taxpayers. Below, I present several examples to 
illustrate. 
The first is the tax unit. The Carter Report suggested that using the family as the 
tax unit would be fairer because it better reflects the way that economic resources are 
actually distributed (or so the commissioners believed when they wrote in the 1960s).
407
 
That is, taxation based on family unit would be a better way to collect taxes according to 
the ability to pay of the members of society. The Royal Commission’s solution included a 
“marriage penalty” – a higher tax liability for a married couple as compared on two 
individuals with the same incomes – to recognize the economies of living together. Those 
unhappy with the recommendation that creates a disincentive to marriage should 
remember, as Boris Bittker demonstrated, that the tax system can not be simultaneously 
progressive, neutral toward marriage, and, horizontally equitable toward couples.
408
 The 
lesson here is that policy makers and designers of an income tax system need to make 
assumptions. The Carter Report would have had us assume that families pooled 
resources. Such an assumption would risk inequity toward those people for whom it is 
not true. Another resolution to the problem of family taxation would reflect another set of 
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assumptions, and would similarly risk inequity for those whose family arrangements fall 
outside of those assumptions.
409
  
Another difficult decision that must be made relates to the tax period. As the 
Carter Report acknowledges, our decision to tax based on annual income is essentially 
arbitrary in terms of equity.
410
 It reflects a balance of concerns about the administrative 
practicality of the system: the government’s ongoing need for money, the administrative 
burden on the taxpayer in complying, the tax authority’s needs for regular reporting, and 
so on. However, it is recognized that the one-year period (and perhaps any period) will 
create some inequity. Taxpayers who have more control over the timing of their income 
will be able to gain an advantage through deferral. Given a progressive rate structure, 
taxpayers whose income fluctuates year-to-year will face a high tax bill in years in which 
their income is high enough to be taxed at the higher rates, but which might not 
accurately reflect their ability to pay over the longer-term. Measures have been suggested 
and implemented to alleviate these inequities; however, none can escape the fact that the 
choice of period is essentially arbitrary. Or, at least, the bare idea of taxation in 
proportion to ability to pay does not prescribe any particular timeline. It invites us to 
consider other factors – efficiency, administrative practicality – and to attempt to mitigate 
inequity that is created by the choice of a period in other ways. Canada’s Registered 
Retirement Savings Plan provides a measure of income averaging, generally working to 
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move some income from high income earning years to lower income earning years.
411
 
The Carter Report recommended averaging incomes over blocks of no more than five 
years.
412
 The idea of averaging over a lifetime is sometimes floated as the most equitable, 
though it might be difficult to implement, and, for its part, the Royal Commission was not 
convinced that equity required it.
413
 
 aving decided to tax individuals’ incomes annually does not settle matters. 
Rather, it begs the question: what is income? Even if we have accepted the 
comprehensive tax base (the Schantz-Haig-Simons formulation noted above), there will 
be a plethora of details to work out what constitutes income in practice.  
To take one example, the system will need to separate personal consumption, 
which by definition is included in income, from amounts spent in the process of earning 
income that ought to be deductible because we seek to apply the tax only on profit. As 
Bittker points out, advocates of the comprehensive tax base “cannot be blamed for the 
ha iness of this distinction”, it owes simply to the fact that “our lives are not so 
compartmentali ed that … borderline items can be readily classified.”
414
 If real estate 
agents are all required to wear suits, then perhaps the cost of the suit (or the additional 
cost of wearing a suit rather than some alternative) ought to be deductible from real estate 
agents’ incomes. We may feel differently, however, if we learn that a particular real 
estate agent enjoys wearing suits, and wears them even while she is not working. Many 
other examples of mixed business/personal expenses are conceivable: “the lawyer who 
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can use his secretary on personal errands; the physician who reads the National 
Geographic before putting it in his waiting room; the executive whose family occupies 
empty seats on a company plane.”
415
 No rule can satisfactorily treat each of these 
situations according to our notions of income or ability to pay. To be implemented, the 
system needs to make assumptions that will be reasonably fair for most taxpayers, most 
of the time. 
Similarly, the tax system will need to deal with in-kind compensation. Employers 
regularly pay certain expenses for employees, and many of these will have some personal 
character. The task of deciding which of these ought to be included in the employees’ 
income has been called “one of the most enduring problems in fashioning an equitable, 
efficient, and administrable income tax.”
416
 In a classic illustration, Friedrich 
Kleinwätcher suggested considering a Flügeladjutant (regimental aide-de-camp) who is 
paid as an ordinary officer, but lives royally at no expense to himself.
417
 He accompanies 
the prince to the theatre and opera, eats at the royal table, and so on. The employer has 
subsidi ed the employee’s personal consumption, effectively increasing the employee’s 
income. To add to the conundrum, however, we assume that the Flügeladjutant despises 
hunting and the opera.
418
 A near-infinite variety of nuances may be added: perhaps the 
Flügeladjutant is forced to attend the opera, but has no other duties associated with it; 
perhaps he is forced to attend and to serve or protect the prince while there; perhaps he 
comes to enjoy the opera over the course of his employment. Kim Brooks effectively 
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shows that the situation is not as hopeless as Henry Simons believed, and it is possible to 
develop guidelines to fairly treat in-kind compensation while being guided by equity, 
neutrality, and administrative practicality.
419
 However, the implication is that equity will, 
at least in some cases, be sacrificed for the sake of administrability or neutrality. 




I do not present these as specific problems to be solved, but rather as illustrations 
of the general point that perfection will always elude us. The income tax strives for 
equity, but the diversity of human arrangements means that the universal application of a 
set of tax rules will never produce a system that truly taxes all likes alike. 
5.3.1.2 ABILITY TO PAY IN THE OFFER-IN-COMPROMISE PROGRAM 
When a taxpayer is unable to pay her tax debt, the first instinct of the Canadian 
tax system is to assume that she is the author of her own misfortune. We assume that she 
chose to over-consume or make risky investments. In other words, we assume that the tax 
system correctly estimated her ability to pay, and her failures to pay are her own fault. 
However, as I suggested in the discussion above, we should be less confident in 
presuming that the tax system always works equitably. 
In deciding whether to accept a compromise offer, the IRS looks at the taxpayer’s 
current situation, considering all of the decisions the taxpayer has made, her misfortunes 
and windfalls, the amount she actually needs to maintain herself and her dependants and 
her prospects for earning money in the future.  ere, the IRS refers to a taxpayer’s “ability 
to pay”, though not with any obvious reference to the complex academic discussion of 
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ability to pay as a norm grounding the income tax system.
421
 In gauging ability to pay in 
that context, the IRS attempts to estimate how much it can reasonably expect to collect, 
given the taxpayer’s assets and its judicial and administrative collection remedies. 
The offer-in-compromise program’s view of ability to pay is something like what 
Richard Goode called “the crudest sense” of ability to pay: “In the crudest sense, ability 
to pay means only the possession of resources that can be turned over to the state. A 
pauper can pay little in taxes whereas a millionaire can pay much.”
422
 Goode argued that 
ability to pay as a tax norm needed to convey something more. His attempt at a definition 
was as follows: “Ability to pay taxes is the capacity for paying without undue hardship 
on the part of the person paying or an unacceptable degree of interference with objectives 
that are considered socially important by other members of the community.”
423
 Still, in 
building a tax system based on this definition (or, in any case, some definition meaning 
more than simply having the resources to turn over to the government), it is not entirely 
clear that the “crudest sense” of ability to pay should be completely forgotten. While 
ability to pay should mean something more, where the “crudest sense” is violated – 
where the system demands much of a pauper – it might indicate that the system’s 
estimation of that taxpayer’s ability to pay is mistaken. 
As I argued above, we can not assume that the tax system always does a good job 
of enforcing equity between taxpayers. Where a taxpayer is unable to pay, it might be 
that the rules, which are generally fair, did not adequately reflect her particular family 
situation or health care needs. Perhaps her occupation demands that she incur 
extraordinary expenses that are not recognized by the rules, or perhaps some disaster or 
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misfortune has drastically affected her assets while leaving her tax debts intact. In short, 
it may be the case that some idiosyncrasy of her situation has made it such that the tax 
laws of general application do not produce an equitable result in her case.  
In those cases, compromise would not reduce the equity of the system. On the 
contrary, to forgive some portion of those debts would be to correct inequities worked by 
the tax system and to enhance the overall equity of the system. To design a compromise 
system that actually worked to enhance equity may prove a significant challenge; 
however, at the first step, we should be able to admit that our tax system is not perfectly 
equitable and that, in some cases, forgiving a portion of a taxpayer’s debt will be the most 
equitable course. The next step is to suggest that the pool of cases in which a taxpayer is 
unable to pay her tax debts is a reasonable pool to draw from in considering where the 
system may have gone wrong in estimating taxpayers’ abilities to pay. 
5.3.2 BARGAINING FOR EQUITY 
The argument based on inevitable inequity in the tax laws may not be entirely 
convincing. However, the case for a compromise system can be made without it. Putting 
aside concerns about the inherent inequity in the tax system, the case for equity through 
compromise changes. It might be argued that the tax system is, if not perfect, at least 
perfectible.
424
 If there are inequities in the system, it might be preferable to attempt to 
correct them, rather than implement a stopgap measure. Similarly, an optimist might hope 
that, over time and on a large scale, the various inequities in the system work themselves 
out. Even accepting inequity in the system, one might object that a compromise system 
risks exacerbating, rather than remedying, those inequities. 
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Whatever the reason for rejecting the argument for compromise in section 5.3.1, a 
model of compliance as equity might be more persuasive. Here, I return to a more 
traditional belief in the power of our concept of income to act as a good proxy for ability 
to pay and in the aptitude of the substantive tax laws to accurately define and measure 
income. On this view, in most cases, the correct application of the Income Tax Act 
produces something very close to an equitable result. While we posit an equitable tax 
code and equitable enforcement mechanisms, we are left with inequities caused by non-
compliance.  
If perfect compliance is the ideally equitable situation, the question then becomes 
whether the tax authority can bargain to improve compliance or increase collections. The 
answer is not as clear as it is when discussing administrative savings. Even if we are 
persuaded that there may be cases, in either the debt collection or the dispute resolution 
context, where full and vigorous pursuit of all available remedies costs more than it is 
worth and that a compromise would result in a better financial situation for the 
government, we might be willing to spend that extra money either in defence of correct 
assessments or in pursuit of debts for the sake of ensuring that each taxpayer pays her fair 
share. 
However, there are at least two ways in which we might think about the tax 
authority bargaining to increase equity under these assumptions, both of which are 
contained in the American offer-in-compromise model. The first is to set the bar for 
compromise at an increase in the amount collected, as the offer-in-compromise program 
does. If we were thinking only in terms of the efficiency of administration, we might 
want the tax authority to make a rational economic decision based on the amount it could 
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collect through its collection powers, the cost of pursuing that collection, and perhaps the 
administrative cost of the compromise program. To increase the equity of the system, 
however, we would want to ensure that the accepted compromise narrows the gap 
between the tax assessed and the tax collected. That is, the taxpayer should offer more 
than the tax authority expects to be able to collect otherwise. By assumption, this 
increased collection will improve the equity of the tax system. 
The first question about this proposition is how the taxpayer can be expected to pay 
more than the tax authority, with its formidable collection powers, would be able to 
collect. In the American context, part of the answer seems to be that taxpayers have a 
variety of resources that they can access to finance a compromise, but that are 
unavailable to the tax collector. To fund a compromise offer, they borrow from family, 
friends, or commercial lenders, or draw from retirement assets that the IRS would not 
otherwise levy or seize.
425
 For whatever reason, the results in the American program 
show that accepted compromises, on average, allow the IRS to collect more than it is able 
to collect when it rejects the offer. Accepted offers also tend to result in more collection 
than the IRS collects on the general pool of debts that are still unpaid after two years.
426
 
The bargain also has the potential to improve compliance over time, even if equity 
is sacrificed in the short term. If forgiving a tax debt creates some inequity in the current 
year (or over the past several years), but makes the system more equitable in the future, 
the result might be an increase in equity overall. The offer-in-compromise program 
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attempts something like that by making the compromise contingent on the forgiven 
taxpayer’s compliance over the next five years. 
I admit that this type of bargain may seem absurd. In exchange for the forgiveness 
of a debt which the tax authority did not expect to be able to collect, the taxpayer agrees 
to fulfill the obligations that were already imposed on her by law. Nevertheless, it appears 
to be effective in the U.S. context.
427
 It is impossible to say whether a similar 
compromise system in Canada would yield similar compliance benefits; however, there 
are reasons to be optimistic. As noted in chapter 3, a settlement procedure would provide 
a mode of interaction between that taxpayer and tax authority that is not currently 
available, perhaps cause taxpayers to see the tax authority in a different light and 
encourage compliance among taxpayers who have only had the chance to interact with 
the CRA in an adversarial role. More concretely, it would provide another point of 
engagement between delinquent taxpayer and the CRA, provide an incentive for those 
taxpayers to be proactive in making contact with the CRA, and provide the CRA with 
more information about delinquent taxpayers, allowing it to make more informed 
decisions about collection and to improve both the compromise program and its treatment 
of debt collection generally. 
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Moreover, in discussions about sacrificing some equity in the present to gain 
compliance (and therefore equity) in the future, it is important to remember how much 
equity the system stands to lose. In the Canadian context, where the Crown’s tax claims 
rank as ordinary unsecured claims and can be discharged in bankruptcy, the CRA may be 
able to successfully identify cases in which the government has relatively little to lose by 
agreeing to a compromise. 
5.3.3 SETTLEMENT OF TAX DISPUTES: THE EQUITY OF SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE 
The case for compromise settlement of tax disputes, if there is one, needs to be 
different. If the taxpayer involved in the dispute is able to pay the tax assessed, then the 
justification for compromise is weakened to the extent that it depends on the fact that the 
tax authority does not expect the debt to be paid in full. Further, the fact that the taxpayer 
disputes the amount of her tax liability does not necessarily provide a compelling reason 
to believe that the system has worked in unfair ways in her case, as I have argued that an 
inability to pay might. 
However, as I noted in the second chapter, a rule that strictly forbids compromise 
settlements, while allowing “principled” settlements, runs the risk of giving an advantage 
to taxpayers who are better-advised. In practice, richer taxpayers will be able to afford 
better advice and to achieve better results in a principled basis settlement negotiation. 
Meanwhile, less well-off taxpayers, who are often self-represented in these disputes, will 
feel the full force of the principled basis doctrine. So, where something that might be 
more like contractual bargaining can occur where two parties are equally informed about 
the restrictions on the negotiation (the provisions of the Income Tax Act), taxpayers 
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without access to professional, experienced advisors will be stuck in an adjudicative 
relationship where the tax authority plays the role of the decision maker. 
While I suggested in chapter 2 that this phenomenon is likely to exist, there is little 
data available to help discern its impact. In the absence of data, prescribing a solution is 
somewhat difficult. If better advised parties have a relatively free hand in negotiations 
already, then completely reversing the principled basis doctrine would have a progressive 
effect by allowing the less wealthy access to the same type of interaction with the tax 
authority. However, if the principled basis doctrine is at least somewhat effective, 
constraining even the very rich, the removing it might increase the advantage that those 
with more power and more money have in negotiations with the CRA when compared to 
those with less power and money in similar negotiations. 
One potential solution would be an explicitly progressive scheme to allow 
compromise settlements. That is, we might allow compromise settlements only for 
taxpayers below a certain means threshold. While this might have a progressive effect, 
respecting vertical equity, it would seem problematic from the perspective of horizontal 
equity. In addition to the difficulties that compromise settlements might create for equity, 
as I discuss below, there may be problematic incentives created by a system in which tax 
disputes were commonly settled on the basis of compromise. 
5.4 NEUTRALITY: THE PROBLEMATIC INCENTIVES CREATED BY 
COMPROMISE 
5.4.1 DEALING WITH THE MORAL HAZARD OBJECTION 
Even if we are satisfied that a compromise procedure would yield practical 
administrative benefits and that it might not violate equity, we may still have concerns 
about the incentives that such a procedure would create. Taxpayers might be more 
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inclined to make risky investments or increase their consumption where they know that 
forgiveness of tax debts is available. This is an application of the “moral ha ard” concept 
that evolved from the study of insurance and is now commonly applied in many areas of 
law.
428
 Broadly then, moral ha ard refers to the “perverse consequences of well-
intentioned efforts to share the burdens of life”.
429
 More concretely, in the area of 
insurance where the concept originated, moral hazard refers to the natural tendency to 
engage in riskier behaviour (or do less to mitigate risks) when the risks are insured.
430
 
One way to think about a program like the offer-in-compromise program is as a 
mechanism for sharing the risks of default on tax debts, and so moral hazard concerns can 
be raised.
431
 However, the literature on moral hazard also suggests the solution to these 
concerns. While, from one point of view, the offer-in-compromise program may appear 
generous – a large debt may be forgiven – the cost of participating is quite steep. There is 
both a fee and a non-refundable deposit as part of the application process. Moreover, 
having an offer accepted generally requires that the taxpayer offer more than the IRS 
could reasonably expect to collect using its substantial collection powers. This may 
require liquidating assets and changing lifestyles. The taxpayer also agrees to comply 
with the tax laws for the next five years. The moral hazard literature recognizes that 
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deductibles and coinsurance are ways of reducing the effect of moral hazard. The 
mechanism can be explained as follows: if moral hazard results from the difference 
between the actual loss and the loss as “felt” by the insured, the deductibles and 
coinsurance offers ways reduce the gap between actual loss and felt loss, and thereby 
reduce the moral hazard.
432
  
In the case of the offer-in-compromise procedure, there should be little doubt that 
the forgiven debtor is made to feel the loss in a substantial and lasting way. In addition to 
the fee and the non-refundable deposit, offers are only accepted where IRS officials are 
satisfied that the offer represents substantially all of the debtor’s ability to pay. The 
requirement of compliance for 5 years further ensures that the loss of tax revenue is “felt” 
by the debtor for some time. Moreover, it is worth keeping in mind that, in this context, 
imposing the full liability on the tax debtor is not generally considered to be an option. 
Thus, the gap that ought to be considered in discussing the moral hazard added by the 
compromise procedure is not the gap between the actual loss and the loss felt by the 
debtor, but the gap between the loss that would have been felt without the compromise 
(via bankruptcy, for example) and the loss felt through the compromise procedure. 
5.4.2 INCENTIVES IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
The incentives that would be created by compromise in the dispute resolution 
context are perhaps the best support for proponents of the principled basis doctrine. 
Because the cost of litigation is high, the financial incentive toward extrajudicial 
settlement of disputes is strong. However, if the CRA considered only the potential cost 
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of litigation, there would be a good case for settling nearly every dispute, and therefore a 
strong incentive for taxpayers to dispute their assessments.  
The prospect of a tax discount for taxpayers who choose to dispute their 
assessments is perhaps the most troubling potential complication should the principled 
basis doctrine be overridden. If it resulted in a significant increase in tax disputes, it 
would risk undermining the cost savings of compromise. Moreover, it would exacerbate 
concerns about the horizontal equity of compromise by reducing the tax liability of those 
with the time, energy, and inclination to fight with the CRA, with no regard to their 
ability to pay. 
The likely response to a problem of increased numbers of disputes would be to 
increase barriers to the dispute resolution process. However, the trend in Canadian tax 
law has been going the other way: to reduce barriers to access to the dispute resolution 
system, while ensuring (perhaps imperfectly) that dispute is resolved in accordance with 
the Income Tax Act. It is not at all clear that reversing this trend would have a beneficial 
outcome, though I hope to consider questions around access-to-justice issues in more 
detail in future research. 
5.5 SETTLEMENT AS A TAX EXPENDITURE 
As Shu-Yi Oei points out in the American context, the offer-in-compromise 
program might be thought of as social insurance.
433
 Oei builds her analysis by analogy to 
the bankruptcy system, which, as she says, scholars have long recognized might be 
thought of as a form of insurance. The premiums, in this case, are built into the cost of 
borrowing. The risk of financial catastrophe, then, is shared among all who borrow, and 
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its victims have the chance to have their debts discharged though the bankruptcy process. 
By the same token, we might think of a system like the U.S. offer-in-compromise 
program as an insurance program (“social insurance” because it is mandated by the 
government). In this case, we would imagine the premiums built into the taxes that we all 
pay, and that the debt forgiveness built into the system insures us against the risk that we 
will be unable to pay our taxes. 
In tax policy terms, we might think of such a program, when executed through the 
tax system, as a tax expenditure. That is, a government spending program offering 
financial relief to those who need it. In Canada, our governments do this in a variety of 
ways. One of those could be a tax collection system that offered forgiveness. In that case, 
the traditional tax policy framework would no longer apply, and the question would be 
whether the program made sense as a matter of public policy. There are several reasons to 
think that it might, depending on how it was designed. 
If the program was able to target those individuals for whom it would do the most 
good, it would be a very effective policy tool. The ideal target group consists of those 
who are at serious risk of bankruptcy without the forgiveness, but are saved from it by the 
forgiveness. Those who would go bankrupt are the taxpayers for whom the program 
would have a very low cost to the government, thanks to its unfavoured position in 
bankruptcy proceedings. The benefits discussed above – increased collections in the short 
term and increased compliance in the longer term – could still be realized. Moreover, if 
forgiveness of tax debts saves the debtor from bankruptcy and gives them a better chance 
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to continue earning money, then it will also reduce the chance that they will be a burden 
on other parts of the social safety net, thereby saving costs elsewhere.
434
 
5.6 A COMPROMISE OUTLET WITHIN THE TAX SYSTEM WOULD BE 
PREFERABLE TO THE STATUS QUO 
One possible objection to the inclusion of more forgiveness in the tax system is that 
Canadian taxpayers already have several avenues to have their debts forgiven. Canadian 
policy makers have simply chosen to locate most of these outside the tax system for the 
sake of preserving the integrity of the system. Indeed, Canadian taxpayers have several 
possible avenues to pursue the compromise or settlement of their tax debts: the partial 
forgiveness under the taxpayer relief provisions; the total forgiveness possible with a 
remission order; and the discharge of the debt that might be accomplished using the 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. However, none of these offers the combination of 
administrative simplicity and the ability to be tailored towards tax policy goals as a full 
compromise mechanism located within the tax system would. 
Remission orders can be recommended by the CRA, through the Minister of 
National Revenue, but can only be given by the federal cabinet.  According to the 
wording of the provision, remission orders are to be granted where “the collection of the 
tax or the enforcement of the penalty is unreasonable or unjust or that it is in the public 
interest to remit the tax or penalty.”
435
 The wording sounds something like the equitable 
stop gap that I suggest a compromise procedure might be, but it lacks any other benefits. 
It is a rather cumbersome process that risks appearing politically motivated. It does not 
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benefit the government as a creditor in any obvious financial sense, and it does not create 
a process tailored to concerns around either administrability or neutrality. 
The taxpayer relief provisions have similar properties. They may be less 
administratively burdensome than remission orders, but they offer little opportunity for 
the government to improve its position as a creditor. The amount of relief they can 
provide is limited. In most cases, requests for taxpayer relief need to focus on what 
circumstances prevented compliance, and not whether the taxpayer has the resources to 
pay the full debt. 
When all else fails, the CRA accepts less than it is owed in bankruptcy 
proceedings. As discussed in chapter 4, most tax debts are treated as ordinary unsecured 
claims in bankruptcy. However, it is worth remembering that, prior to the insolvency, the 
Crown is not an ordinary creditor in an important sense. Other creditors have the option 
of working with the debtor to restructure or settle their claims. They have the option of 
accepting less than they are owed if it is in their interest. The CRA has strong powers to 
enforce collection prior to bankruptcy, but in terms of settlement, the CRA is constrained 
in a way that no other creditors are. 
That the CRA participates in bankruptcy proceedings, at least in some cases, as an 
unusually disadvantaged ordinary creditor lends support to the idea that locating some 
compromise or settlement mechanism within the tax system could improve the efficiency 
of Canada’s tax administration. That is, removing or reducing the CRA’s constraints in 
pre-insolvency settlement of debts would, in the framework of the debtor-creditor 
relationship where bankruptcy proceedings loom, remove a disadvantage that CRA 
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currently has when compared to other creditors. In doing so, the Crown would have little 
to lose financially, but could stand to collect more money sooner in some cases. 
The other reason to believe that incorporating some compromise mechanism into 
the Canadian tax system, rather than leave that function to bankruptcy, would produce 
gains in tax policy terms is that the mechanism could be designed with these concerns in 
mind. Bankruptcy and insolvency legislation is animated by a number of factors and 
concerns: a desire for the orderly settlement of debts, fair treatment of a creditors, a fresh 
start for the debtor, and so on. As discussed in chapter 4, the tax system receives some 
consideration as well. However, the primary concerns of the bankruptcy and insolvency 
regimes in Canada are not contiguous with the primary concerns of tax policy. According 
to one Canadian commentator, “insolvency law is concerned with the inability of a 
person to pay claims owing to others.”
436
 In response, some regimes concern themselves 
with the liquidation of the debtor’s assets, and others are more preoccupied with 
preserving the viability of the debtor’s business as a going concern.
437
 Regimes may be 
more or less interested in the “economic rehabilitation” of the debtor.
438
 There may be a 
plethora of other goals that insolvency regimes need to consider.
439
 
In some cases, the goals of tax policy and of insolvency law are well-aligned. Both 
demonstrate sensitivity to economic efficiency and the functioning of the market, for 
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example. However, the goals of insolvency regimes generally include fairness or equity 
among creditors, while tax policy aims at fairness or equity among all the members of 
society. And, naturally, an insolvency regime’s practical concerns about the ease with 
which rules can be administered will be directed at that regime and not at the 
administration of the tax system. Accordingly, it stands to reason that the administrability 
of the tax system, as well as equity and efficiency, could be improved by taking some 
cases out of the hands of the bankruptcy system and putting them into the context of the 
tax system where a settlement mechanism could be designed with these concerns in mind. 
5.6.1 THE PROBLEMATIC CASE FOR COMPROMISE IN THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
CONTEXT 
While there is a strong case for the savings that the revenue authorities would reap 
from compromise in the resolution of tax disputes, many will worry that a move toward 
the compromise of tax disputes will have problematic effects in terms of equity and 
neutrality that outweigh any administrative gains. In an attempt to add to the 
conversation, I have argued that there may also be some overlooked inequities owing to 
the rule that disputes can only be resolved on a principled basis. 
While I raise this concern, I also suggest that we do not have sufficient data to 
prescribe a solution with any confidence. We should expect that taxpayers with better 
professional advice will be able to negotiate more favourable “principled” settlement than 
those without good representation; however, the extent of this effect is unknown, and so a 
solution to correct this inequity is difficult to formulate. I posited two possible solutions 
above, but suggest that the incentives they would create for taxpayers are likely to 
outweigh (and possibly undermine) any gains. 
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While we might hope for better data that would allow us to look more closely at 
this issue, it is worth noting that the tax dispute resolution system has other measures in 
place that may be helpful. The informal procedure stream of tax cases, for example, is 
available to reduce the costs of dispute resolution for both the government and the 
taxpayer. Less well-off taxpayers are more likely to have tax disputes with smaller 
amounts at stake; so, to some extent the availability of the informal procedure will even 
the playing field. While taxpayers with more resources will be better able to settle 
disputes extrajudicially, the cost of judicial dispute resolution has been reduced for at 
least some taxpayers who lack resources.  
5.7 REVIEW OF DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
While the case for some theoretical compromise program is made out above, the 
details of such a program would be significant. The discussion in this chapter has 
explored various possible justifications for compromise, and each might suggest slightly 
different criteria that a compromise program should consider. To conclude the chapter, I 
return to the various design considerations to examine the question of whether a program 
could be devised that would meet all of the goals. 
To satisfy a concern about administrative practicality the program ought to accept 
offers where the result is a net gain for the fisc, taking into account the amount of the 
offer, the amount that the tax authority can reasonably expect to collect if it rejects the 
offer, the cost of pursuing those collection methods, and the cost of processing the 
compromise. There is a certain amount of uncertainty we can expect in performing this 
calculation. The amount of the debt that could be collected is never certain until the debt 
is either paid in full or discharged in bankruptcy. However, we can safely assume that 
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those charged with tax collection have enough experience to make a reasonable, educated 
decision about whether the compromise is likely to net more revenue than the exercise of 
their collection powers would. 
However, an approach to forgiveness in the collections context that took equity 
seriously might require more of the taxpayer that seeks to have a debt forgiven. We might 
consider equity to have been sacrificed if the tax authority compromised simply to save 
the cost of fully pursuing collection action. On the other hand, if the compromise allows 
the tax authority to obtain as much or more than they expected to be able to collect, and 
assuming that the tax authority’s expectations are informed and reasonable, it becomes 
very difficult to argue that the compromise has decreased the equity of the system. Even 
if the compromise creates inequities – perhaps because of the imbalance of information 
between the taxpayer and the CRA, the tax authority may underestimate the amount that 
could be collected – these temporary inequities might be acceptable if the taxpayer 
follows through on a promise to be compliant in the future, improving the equity of the 
system in the long-term. 
Finally, we need to be concerned about the incentives created by a compromise 
system. To this end, the Carter Report recommended that all compromises made under 
an offer-in-compromise program be made public.
440
 The American offer-in-compromise 
program currently requires an application fee and a non-refundable deposit, which are 
also likely to be helpful in curbing abuses of the program. I suggested above that we need 
not be overly concerned about the risks of moral hazard for two main reasons. First, 
while a program like the American offer-in-compromise program forgives a debt and 
thereby socializes the risk of inability to pay a tax debt, it also ensures that the tax debtor 
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is made to bear as much of the loss as possible. While the actual loss is still greater than 
the loss felt by the debtor, the loss felt is significant. Second, these risks are already 
socialized in other ways. The discharge of tax debts in bankruptcy and the broader social 
safety net already provide tax debtors with some insurance against the risks of default.  
To be clear, we can not expect to eliminate the effect that the introduction of a 
compromise program would have. Where it is available, some taxpayers will, consciously 
or unconsciously, change their behaviour and end up relying on it. What I suggest, 
however, is that measures can be taken to reduce the frequency and intensity of this 
problem, as they are in the United States. Moreover, in the Canadian context where 
bankruptcy discharges tax debts, it seems that the tax authority has little to lose. 
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CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSION 
This thesis explored issues around the forgiveness of tax debts in the United 
States and Canada from several different angles. Using these different analytical 
frameworks and different points of view, my goal has been to illuminate the Canadian 
approach to compromise in the tax system. To do this, I juxtaposed it against the 
American system, which has at least superficial similarities to the Canadian system, but a 
contrasting approach to forgiveness. Canada and the United States both come from the 
common law tradition and tax policy scholars in two countries make use of similar 
analytical frameworks. We have integrated economies, federal constitutional structures, 
and free trade. Yet, the American tax authorities are authorized to compromise in the 
settlement of tax cases, and the Canadian tax authorities are not. 
An examination of the historical evolution of this situation revealed that 
compromise has always been a part of the American income tax system. However, at 
least in its early development, “[t]he United States income tax law has had relatively little 
influence on the taxation of income in Canada.”
441
 Canada’s approach, on paper, if not 
always in practice, has been to hold the taxing authority to its statutory duty to strictly 




Imposing the classification of legal processes developed by Lon Fuller onto the 
comparison, I argued that the American system makes use of different ways of ordering 
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the relationship between the taxpayer and the tax authority, allowing different modes of 
participation for the taxpayer in the tax system. When compared to the Canadian 
restrictiveness, the offer-in-compromise program looks like a contractual ordering 
system. Within parameters, the parties are allowed to bargain and to reach an agreement 
that each believes is in its interest. Canada, on the other hand, always has the taxpayer 
engaging in adjudicative processes in the tax system. First, the dispute is adjudicated by 
an auditor, then by an appeals officer, later by a government lawyer, and eventually in a 
courtroom, if the dispute is not resolved. At no point, however, is the government’s 
representative really allowed to bargain to resolve the dispute. The Canadian tax system 
eschews a contractual mode of ordering between the taxpayer and the tax authority in the 
context of settlement discussions, where we might expect to find it. Even where the tax 
authority might have the statutory discretion to bargain, as with the taxpayer relief 
provisions, the clear view of the administration is that straightforward bargaining would 
be improper. 
In chapter four, I added context to the discussion by looking at the ways that the 
tax authorities in the two jurisdictions are treated qua creditor. The two jurisdictions both 
give their tax authorities significant powers to collect tax quickly and efficiently. 
However, there are important differences in the ways that tax debts are treated in 
bankruptcy. One way to look at the jurisdictions as presented in chapters 3 and 4 would 
be that each confronts the reality that some tax debtors will be unable to pay in its own 
way. Canada refuses to offer forgiveness within the tax system, but discharge is possible 
in bankruptcy. The United States is willing to compromise in the tax system, but excludes 
the bankruptcy system from making decisions about the forgiveness of tax debts. While 
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several nuances take some of the force out of those broad generalizations, the 
generalization is still enlightening. 
In chapter 5, I looked at the case for compromise in the tax system using the 
traditional evaluative criteria of tax policy. As I suggested first in chapter 2 and again in 
chapter 5, using the tax policy framework might convince Canadian policy makers to 
rethink the uncompromising stance adopted in Canada’s tax system. The assumption that 
any forgiveness necessarily entails a compromise of equity is highly questionable; rather, 
a compromise program might improve the equity and the administrative practicality of 
the system. 
One way to look at the differences explored here is through the lens of culture. 
Ann Mumford compared the tax collection cultures of the U.S. and the U.K. in Taxing 
Culture.
443
 She explained the American “rough justice” approach to tax collection, and 
differences in attitudes towards tax evasion in the two countries.  She wrote: 
“Rough justice” is defined as a system which sacrifices 
accuracy for satisfaction, though the use of imprecise 
computational methods which allow taxpayers to feel that 
they have escaped tax liability … taxpayers have the 
satisfaction of a form of “moral” if not “legal”, cheating, 




Mumford contrasts the American “rough justice” approach with the British approach, 
which expects precision in the calculation of tax liability. 
 Different attitudes toward compromise might also be seen through this framework 
of cultural difference. Like the British approach Mumford explores, the Canadian system 
places high value on the accuracy of the assessment. Refusal to compromise is seen then 
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as a matter of fairness; each taxpayer should pay, precisely, her fair share as calculated 
under the taxing statute. The American taxing culture is more accepting of imprecision, 
and it follows that compromise of this already rough calculation of liability is not seen as 
threatening to the integrity of the system. 
 These cultural differences caution against the wholesale importation of something 
like the American offer-in-compromise program into the Canadian system. As I have 
argued, there is a strong case to be made on tax policy grounds for the forgiveness of 
debts in Canada’s tax system; however, it would be a mistake to expect to be able to 
import the American procedure and have the positive experience and attitudes toward it 
that are visible in the American academic literature. Transplanting a legal mechanism 
from one jurisdiction to another is difficult, if not impossible, precisely because of 
cultural differences.
445
 It is important to be aware that neither the tax policy framework 
nor the American experience, both of which recommend forgiveness in the tax system, 
tell the whole story of how the Canada’s tax culture would react to something like the 
offer-in-compromise procedure being introduced into Canadian law. 
 Still, given the opportunities for forgiveness already available to Canadian 
taxpayers and the potentially low cost and high reward of increasing the availability of 
some of these processes within the tax system, further conversation around a compromise 
mechanism with the parameters I explored in chapter 5 would be worthwhile. While we 
need to sensitive to the particularities of Canada’s tax culture and cautious not to expect a 
Canadian offer-in-compromise program to be the same as the long standing American 
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program, we could still expect a positive outcome in tax policy terms.
446
 Moreover, the 
recent report of the Auditor General found that the amount of undisputed tax that the 
CRA is owed grew faster than government revenue between 2006 and 2012.
447
 This 
finding was reported by the newspapers, and so the time may soon be ripe for a 
conversation about giving the CRA some flexibility to compromise in some cases.
448
 
  In any case, the primary overarching purpose of this project was not to argue for 
the importation of the American offer-in-compromise procedure. Rather, it was to 
explore differences between the Canadian and American treatments of forgiveness in the 
tax system and to use that exploration to illuminate features of Canada’s tax system. The 
U.S. comparison has helped me to shed light on the way in which different forms of 
social ordering and used (and repressed) in the Canadian tax system and been helpful in 
examining the legal context in which forgiveness of tax debts occurs. Moreover, it has 
given me the opportunity to highlight the importance of administrative issues in tax law 
and tax policy, which are too often overlooked.
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